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INTRODUCTION 
Courts and commentators often label federal discrimination statutes as 
torts.1 Since the late 1980s, the courts increasingly applied tort concepts to 
these statutes.2 This Article details a radical shift in the prominence and 
importance of tort law within discrimination jurisprudence. It then explores 
how the Supreme Court’s modern statutory analysis misunderstands both 
tort law and discrimination law.  
The Supreme Court’s use of tort common law in discrimination cases 
has become more robust and automatic over time. In the late 1980s, the 
Court noted that “common-law principles may not be transferable in all 
their particulars to Title VII.”3 By 2011, the Court declared: “[W]e start 
from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the 
background of general tort law.”4 It then automatically applied proximate 
cause to an employment statute.5 The Supreme Court now claims that 
discrimination statutes’ status as torts conveys specific textual statutory 
meaning.6  
The reflexive use of tort law in employment discrimination cases is 
problematic for many reasons. When applying tort law to discrimination 
claims, the Court fails to consider the important fact that Congress 
fundamentally altered the common law employment relationship when it 
made it illegal for employers to discriminate based on protected traits. The 
Court counterintuitively assumes that even though the discrimination 
statutes change the common law—the at-will employment relationship—
Congress meant to retain common law meanings for statutory words. This 
argument is facially problematic, especially because the Supreme Court did 
not interpret the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192 (2011); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 
S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990); DAN B. DOBBS, 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 237 n.2 (2000); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the 
Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their 
Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 72 n.33 (1995). But see Robert Belton, Causation in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235 (1988) (arguing that common law 
causation principles should not be robustly applied to discrimination law). 
 2. For a complete discussion of this evolution of thought, see infra Part I. See also Theodore 
Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a 
Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990) (discussing decisions from the 1989 Supreme Court 
term that applied common law concepts to employment law).  
 3. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986), quoted in Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 792 (1998). 
 4. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191. 
 5. Id. at 1192. 
 6. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532–33 (2013). 
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or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through a common law lens 
during the first three decades after their enactment.7 
The tort label is also difficult to mesh with textualist statutory 
interpretation. The discrimination statutes are not structured like torts and 
do not rely primarily on tort terms of art. When plaintiffs prove 
discrimination claims, they are not proving elements that mimic any 
traditional common law tort. Another conceptual error occurs when the 
Court borrows indiscriminately from across tort regimes without 
recognizing that various pockets of tort obligations reflect different 
doctrinal choices that may not transfer well to other pockets of obligation. 
For example, the Supreme Court repeatedly applies negligence concepts to 
discrimination claims, even though it also claims that disparate treatment 
claims require proof of intent.8 
The tort label also overestimates the work that tort law can adequately 
perform in statutory interpretation. Tort law generally does not have 
independent descriptive power. It does not cohere around a narrow enough 
set of theoretical or doctrinal concepts to provide an answer to many 
statutory questions. The Supreme Court often ignores the possibilities 
provided by tort law and explains tort law as being more fixed, narrow, and 
normatively uncontested than it actually is.  
When the Court describes tort law, it has already made important 
choices about which portions of tort law to integrate into discrimination 
law, and these choices involve narrow conceptions of causation and harm. 
Using this narrow tort frame leads to discrimination law that is primarily 
concerned with individual remedies, rather than a broader response to 
societal discrimination. The move to tort law is thus part of a broader story 
about the privatization of discrimination law that can be seen in the greater 
acceptance of private arbitration9 and the move away from systemic 
discrimination claims.10 
Prioritizing a narrow view of tort law removes textually supportable 
options from statutory analysis without meaningful discussion about why 
the courts narrowed the potential statutory landscape. The courts never 
consider whether their narrow notions of tort causation and harm are 
reflected in the discrimination statutes’ text, intent, or purpose. The 
primary aim of this Article is to urge courts to respect the complexity of 
the judgments at issue by resisting the simple, but also simplistic, allure of 
the reflexive use of tort law. While these errors are problematic when tort 
                                                                                                                     
 7. See infra Section I.A. 
 8. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 & n.15 (1977). 
 9. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1465–66 (2009) (enforcing a union 
agreement to arbitrate individual civil rights claims).  
 10. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552, 2561 (2011) (holding that each 
plaintiff had to establish that she was discriminated against in the same way). 
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law is used as persuasive authority, they become even more problematic 
when tort law is given a high priority in discrimination analysis. 
This is not to argue that tort law has no place in statutory construction. 
It provides a language for discussing competing concerns and encapsulates 
a wealth of prior thinking about difficult issues. Theoretical and doctrinal 
debates in tort law are important because they help to elucidate which 
values should be prioritized and why. But calling a statute a tort does not 
automatically ground it in a specific theoretical construct or even a narrow 
range of constructs and thus the explanatory power of the organizational 
label is weak.  
This Article demonstrates the dangers of the tort label, using the lens of 
two core discrimination statutes: Title VII and the ADEA.11 However, the 
discussion has broader implications. Courts have applied the tort label to a 
variety of statutes and in a wide array of contexts.12  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the move to tortify 
federal discrimination law. Parts II, III, and IV highlight serious problems 
with the way the courts understand, use, and apply tort law in the 
discrimination context. Part V discusses the stakes of the tort label, 
including its tendency to lead to unsatisfactory reasoning that is not 
supported by congressional intent or by the statutes’ text, history, or 
structure.  
I.  THE TORTIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION  
Courts, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and 
legal scholars often describe the core federal antidiscrimination statutes as 
torts.13 Over the past several decades, courts have increasingly used tort 
                                                                                                                     
 11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–
34 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (ADEA). The arguments made in this Article are applicable in the ADA 
context as well. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (ADA). The author is not making 
arguments about cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). 
 12. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1502 (2012) (describing how the Supreme 
Court has applied common law immunity principles to claims under § 1983); Staub v. Proctor 
Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (applying tort doctrines to the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and citing cases); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 
U.S. 532, 543 (1994) (applying common law negligence concepts to the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act (FELA)); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531–33 (1983) (describing the application of common law rules to the 
Sherman Act). 
 13. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990) (referring to the ADEA as a 
statutory tort); Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 72 n.33; Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The After-
Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII 
and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 196–97 (1993) (discussing the 
wide acceptance of Title VII violations as torts). Two commentators note that the move to the tort 
common law was cemented during the 1989 Supreme Court term. See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 
2, at 3. But see William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal to Let 
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law to interpret these statutes. This Part discusses how the Supreme Court 
has changed the way it invokes tort law over time.  
A.  The Pre-Tort Years: 1964–1988 
Title VII, which is considered to be the cornerstone federal 
discrimination statute, provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.14 
Although not identical, the ADEA has similarly broad operative 
language.15 The language of both of these statutes is inexact, and Congress 
did not specifically define key concepts such as “otherwise to discriminate” 
or “because of.”16 
Early Supreme Court decisions interpreting these statutes did not 
explicitly invoke tort law to define key concepts, such as causation, intent, 
or harm. In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,17 
its first case to consider intent, causation, and harm questions under Title 
VII. In Griggs, the Court recognized a disparate impact theory under Title 
VII18 and, in doing so, the Court did not draw upon tort law. The Court 
explicitly rejected the idea that Title VII requires a showing of intent.19 The 
reasoning of the case focused on the goals of Title VII, the interests of 
                                                                                                                     
Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 478 (2013) (arguing that the 
1973 McDonnell Douglas decision was a masked form of res ipsa loquitur). 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).  
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006). This Article does not significantly discuss the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, although it contains broad operative language similar to that of Title VII and the 
ADEA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 2011). 
 16. See 29 U.S.C. § 630; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
 17. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 18. See id. at 430–31. 
 19. Id. at 432.  
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employers, and an eye toward the practical realities of rules that created 
“built-in headwinds.”20 The Court also recognized that EEOC guidelines 
were entitled to deference.21 
In 1973, the Court decided McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,22 the 
next major case to explain the core protections of Title VII. In McDonnell 
Douglas, the Supreme Court created a three-part, burden-shifting test for 
analyzing individual disparate treatment cases.23 Under McDonnell 
Douglas, a court first evaluates the prima facie case, which requires proof 
of the following: 
(i) [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he 
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer 
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he 
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants 
from persons of complainant’s qualifications.24  
If the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of 
discrimination arises.25 The burden of production then shifts to the 
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting 
the employee.26 If the defendant meets this requirement, the plaintiff can 
still prevail by demonstrating that the defendant’s reason for the rejection 
was simply pretext.27 This three-part test does not invoke specific tort 
principles and does not mimic any particular tort.  
During this time, the Court also determined the contours of pattern or 
practice claims and religious accommodation claims without relying on tort 
doctrine.28 The strongest use of tort ideas during this time period occurred 
in the remedies context.29 In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,30 the 
                                                                                                                     
 20. Id. at 430–32 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21. Id. at 433–34. 
 22. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 23. Id. at 802–04. 
 24. Id. at 802. The factors considered in the prima facie case may vary depending on the 
factual scenario presented in the case. Id. at 802 n.13. 
 25. Id. at 802. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 804. In later cases, the Court clarified how the test operates, but the Court did not 
rely on tort concepts in these later cases. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507–08 
(1993); Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–56 (1981).  
 28. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84–85 (1977); Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360–61 (1977). 
 29. Recently, the Supreme Court implied that City of Los Angeles Department of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978), used tort law. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013). While the case did use the words, “but for,” there is no strong 
indication that the Court was invoking tort law. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711. 
 30. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
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Supreme Court described Title VII as requiring a “make whole” remedy.31 
However, this analysis was not based solely on tort law, as the Court also 
invoked contract principles.32 It also noted that Title VII’s back pay remedy 
derived from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).33 In another case, 
in a nonemployment civil rights context, a plurality rejected the idea that “a 
civil rights action for damages constitutes nothing more than a private tort 
suit benefiting only the individual plaintiffs whose rights were violated.”34 
Toward the end of this era, the Court also suggested that it would be 
appropriate to apply common law principles of agency to sexual 
harassment claims, but declined to definitively rule on this issue.35 
Importantly, the Court noted that “such common-law principles may not be 
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII.”36  
Until 1989, the Supreme Court did not rely heavily on tort analysis or 
common law analysis in discrimination cases brought under Title VII or 
the ADEA.37 Rather, the initial contours of pattern and practice, disparate 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Id. at 418–19 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court further reasoned: 
 If backpay were awardable only upon a showing of bad faith, the remedy would 
become a punishment for moral turpitude, rather than a compensation for workers’ 
injuries. This would read the “make whole” purpose right out of Title VII, for a 
worker’s injury is no less real simply because his employer did not inflict it in 
“bad faith.” 
Id. at 422; see also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982) (discussing the make whole 
purpose of Title VII); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978) (“[W]here words are employed 
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this 
country they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the 
contrary.” (alteration in original) (quoting Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 
(1911)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 
(1976) (discussing the make whole nature of a Title VII remedy); id. at 774–75 & n.34 (also noting 
that the NLRA is the model for discrimination damages). 
 32. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418–19 (citing Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867)); 
see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984) (using contract language to describe 
Title VII). 
 33. Moody, 422 U.S. at 419. 
 34. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986). 
 35. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91–92 (1981) (rejecting a 
common law right of contribution under Title VII); Texas Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248, 253–54 (1981) (discussing how the presumption created by a prima facie case is a feature 
of the common law created by previous Supreme Court cases). In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976), the Court indicated that a plaintiff could 
prevail if she established “but for” cause. In a later case, the plurality noted that this did not 
describe the minimal causal standard that a plaintiff is required to meet. Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 n.6 (1989) (discussing that the plaintiff does have to show a “but for” 
cause, but if the plaintiff is able to, she will prevail). 
7
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treatment, sexual harassment,38 and disparate impact occurred without 
heavy reliance on tort law.39  
B.  The Middle Years: 1989–2008 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins40 is a 
watershed case in the intersection of tort and discrimination law. After this 
case, the Supreme Court began to use tort law more often in discrimination 
cases. However, during this period the use of tort law was not usually 
automatic, and when the Court invoked tort law, it balanced the use of tort 
law principles with the needs of the discrimination statutes. 
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff 
could prevail on a Title VII claim if she could show that both legitimate 
and discriminatory reasons played a role in the employer’s refusal to 
promote her.41 In a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
proclaimed that Title VII is a “statutory employment ‘tort.’”42  
Justice O’Connor’s use of the tort label is problematic in several 
respects. Justice O’Connor cited no authority for this statement.43 She does 
not provide a historical, theoretical, or doctrinal account of the relationship 
between common law torts and Title VII.44 Her description of tort law is 
narrow to the extent that she characterized the words “because of” to mean 
“but for” cause.45 Justice O’Connor described tort causation as requiring 
“but for” cause, but did not note that the common law also provides other 
factual cause standards.46  
At the same time, her concurrence did not reflect the rigid formality that 
would occur in later cases. While Justice O’Connor believed that causation 
meant “but for” cause, she disaggregated this question from the question of 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67; Martha Chamallas, Beneath the Surface of Civil Recourse 
Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 527, 538–39 (2013) (discussing a debate about the intersection of tort law and 
sexual harassment).  
 39. The minimal role played by tort law during this period is even more remarkable given that 
the Supreme Court had conceptualized other civil rights statutes as torts during this period. For 
example, in 1974, the Court characterized the housing discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act as “sound[ing] basically in tort.” Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1974). The Court 
was not able to decide what the closest tort analog should be. See id. at 195 & n.10 (arguing that 
housing discrimination could be like common law innkeeper duties, defamation, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, or a dignitary tort). 
 40. 490 U.S. 228. 
 41. Id. at 232. 
 42. Id. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 261–79. 
 45. Id. at 262–63 (citing Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 
421, 499 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)). 
 46. Id.; see, e.g., Taylor v. Fishkind, 51 A.3d 743, 759 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) 
(recognizing “substantial factor” as a factual cause standard in tort causation). 
8
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which party was responsible for proving causation.47 Justice O’Connor 
viewed the case as requiring the Court to determine “what allocation of the 
burden of persuasion on the issue of causation best conforms with the 
intent of Congress and the purposes behind Title VII.”48 Her analysis drew 
on the foundation of prior Title VII and constitutional cases but did not 
describe how the common law of torts intersects with these statutory and 
constitutional sources.49 She also recognized that given the specific ways 
employment decisions are made, requiring a plaintiff to prove that a 
protected trait was a definitive reason for an employment outcome may be 
“tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such decisions.”50 
The other Justices’ responses to Justice O’Connor’s claim that Title VII 
is a tort demonstrated the weak power of the tort label in 1989. A plurality 
of four Justices described the statutory problem before it, not through the 
lens of tort law, but rather as a broader question about the nature of 
causation.51 The issue was not about what tort law required, but about what 
kind of conduct violates Title VII. The plurality recognized that this 
question required the Court to consider how Title VII balanced the interests 
of employees and employers.52 It rejected the idea that causation meant that 
the plaintiff is required to establish “but for” cause.53 The plurality 
reasoned that “[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand 
for ‘but-for causation,’ . . . is to misunderstand them.”54 Justice Byron 
White’s concurrence also rejected the automatic use of tort law to resolve 
the case, and instead relied on First Amendment case law.55 
The dissent in Price Waterhouse is also relevant to the development of 
the tort label. Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, reasoned that to impose a standard 
less than “but for” cause is to “impose liability without causation.”56 This 
statement about tort law is simply incorrect and foreshadowed later 
misunderstanding of tort law. The dissent also tried to characterize prior 
Title VII cases as relying on tort law, even though the cases themselves did 
not specifically draw on tort law.57 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262–63 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 48. Id. at 263. Justice O’Connor cited multiple tort cases that allowed burden shifting to 
bolster her position. Id. at 263–64.  
 49. See id.  
 50. Id. at 273. 
 51. Id. at 237 (plurality opinion). 
 52. Id. at 239. 
 53. Id. at 239–40. 
 54. Id. at 240. 
 55. Id. at 258–60 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 56. Id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 282; see, e.g., Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983); Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
9
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In 1991, Congress responded to Price Waterhouse and other decisions 
by amending Title VII.58 Importantly, the 1991 amendments do not mimic 
tort common law. Congress inserted language in Title VII to clarify that a 
plaintiff may prevail under Title VII if she establishes that a protected trait 
was a “motivating factor” for a decision, and the employer may establish a 
defense only if it shows it would have made the same decision absent a 
protected trait.59 Congress also amended Title VII’s disparate impact 
provisions, and these amendments also do not mimic tort law.60 
Price Waterhouse foreshadowed the importance of tort law in the 
employment discrimination context, but the immediate period after Price 
Waterhouse did not witness the extensive use of tort principles.61 During 
this time period, the Supreme Court decided many important cases without 
relying on tort law. In recognizing disparate impact under the ADEA, the 
Court relied on Title VII case law, the text of the ADEA, and EEOC 
regulations.62 The Court clarified the causal standard required for Title VII 
and ADEA disparate impact cases without using tort law.63 The Court 
discussed causal connections in the ADEA by stating that age had to play a 
“determinative” role in the outcome of the case.64 Even when the Court 
held that an adverse action in a retaliation context had to be something that 
would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining, it did not invoke 
tort law for the reasonable person standard.65 During this period, when the 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; see also Landgraf v. USI 
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250–51 (1994) (stating that “[t]he 1991 [Civil Rights] Act is in large 
part a response to a series of decisions of this Court,” including Price Waterhouse). 
 59. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)) (codifying 
the “motivating factor” criterion); id. § 107(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)) 
(establishing the employer’s defense). 
 60. Id. § 105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)). See generally Smith v. City of 
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). In 1991, Congress also provided enhanced remedies under Title 
VII and these could be characterized as tort-like. However, Title VII narrowly defines 
compensatory damages and has a cap on total compensatory damages and punitive damages that is 
not tied to harm, but rather to the size of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)–(b). Further, Title 
VII’s back pay provision has been characterized as deriving from contract. Those who argue that 
enhanced damages make Title VII more tort-like would also need to consider whether the lack of 
these damages in the ADEA context makes that statute less like a tort. 
 61. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (using the term “but for,” but 
failing to clarify whether the term is being used in its tort sense). 
 62. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233–40. In this case, a concurrence by Justice O’Connor indicated that 
the words “because of” in the ADEA context meant intent or motive. Id. at 249 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 63. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 95–96 (2008); Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656–57 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074–75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(k)), as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 
 64. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) (quoting Hazen 
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 65. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68–70 (2006). 
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Court invoked tort law, it often rejected portions of tort analysis and argued 
that “common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars 
to Title VII.”66  
Two tax cases during this period also rejected tort labels. In United 
States v. Burke, the Supreme Court held that the remedies available in Title 
VII cases prior to 1991 did not reflect tort-like ideas of injury and 
remedy.67 In a concurring opinion, Justice David Souter noted that there 
are reasons to both place Title VII within and also to exclude it from the 
realm of torts.68 He noted that discrimination causes a tort-like dignitary 
harm, but argued that the primary remedy of back pay is contractual in 
nature and that Title VII’s ban on discrimination is an implied contractual 
term in employment relationships.69 Justices O’Connor and Clarence 
Thomas dissented, arguing that even though Title VII did not have tort-like 
remedies, its purposes and operation are like those of tort law.70 Burke’s 
rejection of tort law was a narrow one because the Court noted that the 
1991 amendments to Title VII evinced more tort-like remedies.71  
In Commissioner v. Schleier, the Court reasoned that the ADEA is not 
“based upon tort or tort type rights” because it does not provide a 
comprehensive remedies structure.72 Justice O’Connor and two other 
Justices dissented in Schleier, arguing that the ADEA results in a personal 
injury, as that term is defined for tax purposes.73 Justice O’Connor 
compared the ADEA to a defamation tort claim and noted that the 
availability of a jury trial and liquidated damages makes the ADEA tort-
like.74 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 544–45 (1999) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank 
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing tort law with 
respect to punitive damages). In some cases, references to tort sources are not used to imbue the 
statute with tort law. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998) (quoting a torts treatise 
for the idea that medical professionals can deviate from a consensus view). The Supreme Court has 
also applied tort reasoning to other federal employment statutes. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. 
Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994). 
 67. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 
1838 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 104 (2006)); see also Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 
330–31, 336 (1995) (holding that certain ADEA damages are independent of personal injury 
damages), superseded by statute on other grounds, Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 
§ 1605. 
 68. Burke, 504 U.S. at 246–48 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 69. Id. at 247–48. 
 70. Id. at 248–49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 241 n.12 (majority opinion). 
 72. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (2013)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 73. Id. at 342–43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 341–43. 
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Outside of Price Waterhouse, the most robust use of the common law 
during this period came in cases that dealt with agency principles and 
statutory coverage.75 In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells, 
the Court noted that when a statute uses a word with a settled meaning at 
common law, then the Court would use the common law to fill any gaps in 
meaning.76 The Court then referred to common law master-servant law to 
help resolve the case, even though the type of entity at issue in the case, the 
professional corporation, did not exist at the common law.77 Clackamas is 
typical of the cases during this period as its holding does not adopt the 
common law wholesale. Rather, the Court used the common law to justify 
applying a test created by the EEOC, a test that does not mimic the 
common law in all respects.78  
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton79 and Burlington Industries v. 
Ellerth,80 the Supreme Court decided when employers would be liable for 
the actions of agents in harassment cases. The Court repeatedly relied on 
agency principles applicable to tort claims.81 However, neither opinion 
discussed why the Court applied tort law agency principles to 
discrimination claims, other than noting that Title VII uses the term 
“agent.”82 Further, these cases balance agency considerations with what the 
Court claimed are limits imposed by Title VII.83 As discussed in more 
detail later, the Court created a new law of agency for Title VII harassment 
cases that does not mimic agency law applied in tort cases.84 
                                                                                                                     
 75. Some may argue that the use of a reasonable person standard in harassment cases is tort-
like, but reasonableness is used to define the severity of the harm and considers the reasonable 
person’s perception of harm, see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993), unlike the 
tort concept of a reasonable person, which determines the standard of care the defendant owes the 
plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 
(2010). The Supreme Court did not invoke tort law when defining sexual harassment to contain a 
reasonable person test, and the factors the Court directs lower courts to consider in defining when a 
reasonable person would objectively encounter harm are different than how the reasonable person 
test is conceived in the common law. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22. Further, the reasonable person 
standard is also used in criminal law and in contracts. 
 76. Clackamas, 538 U.S. 440, 447 (2003). In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, the Court 
used the common law of remedies and agency and cited the restatements of torts and agency relating 
to punitive damages and vicarious liability, respectively. 527 U.S. 526, 537–38, 542–44 (1999). 
The Court also created a hybrid legal doctrine that does not rely purely on tort or agency law. Id. at 
545–46. 
 77. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 447–48. 
 78. Id. at 448–51. 
 79. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 80. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 81. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–94, 796–97, 801–02; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755–60; see also 
Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 542–45; Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(using tort principles of vicarious liability to assess defendant–employer’s liability for Title VII 
hostile-work-environment sexual harassment).  
 82. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791–92. 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 792. 
 84. See infra notes 272–76 and accompanying text. 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/3
2014] THE TORT LABEL 1063 
 
Faragher and Ellerth made several references to tort law. Faragher 
held that an employer will be liable for coworker harassment if the 
employer is negligent in allowing the conduct to occur.85 It indicated that 
one objective of Title VII is to make an individual whole.86 In Ellerth, the 
Court discussed workplace tortfeasors and the concept of avoidable 
consequences.87 Despite the references to tort law, the doctrine created in 
Faragher and Ellerth is not tort law. Rather, it is a hybrid of agency law, 
tort law, prior case law in discrimination cases, and Title VII remedies 
principles. 
C.  The Modern Cases: 2009 to Present 
Three opinions during this time period show a change in the way that 
tort law is invoked in discrimination cases: Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services,88 Staub v. Proctor Hospital,89 and University of Texas 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.90 In these three cases, the use of 
tort law commands a majority of the Court. The use of tort law is also tied 
to textual claims, where certain words or concepts in discrimination law 
are directly interpreted through the lens of tort law. 
In Gross, the Court held that the ADEA required a showing of “but for” 
cause.91 In so holding, the Court rejected the idea that the ADEA should 
use the same causal standard as Title VII. After rejecting the Title VII 
causal standard, the Justices were faced with a choice. What should the 
ADEA’s causal standard be? For the majority opinion, the answer was 
simple. The words “because of” mean “but for” cause.92 In support of this 
proposition, Justice Thomas cited two cases outside the employment 
discrimination context as well as a torts treatise.93 Just like Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse,94 Justice Thomas did not 
explain why citing a torts treatise was appropriate. To reach this holding, 
Justice Thomas was required to ignore a prior Supreme Court case that 
                                                                                                                     
 85. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08. 
 86. Id. at 805–06. 
 87. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760, 764 (1998); see also Pa. State Police v. 
Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146 (2004) (noting Faragher’s and Ellerth’s use of the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences). Importantly, in an earlier decision, the Court noted that the avoidable consequences 
doctrine is a general principle of remedies in both the torts and contracts contexts. Ford Motor Co. 
v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 & n.15 (1982). 
 88. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). 
 89. 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). 
 90. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 91. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92. See id. at 2350. 
 93. Id. (citing Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2008) and 
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64 & n.14 (2007)). 
 94. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
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suggested a different conclusion.95 Importantly, the opinion ignored that 
tort common law provides more than one factual cause standard.  
The Gross decision is also notably different than O’Connor’s 
concurrence in Price Waterhouse. It is strongly textual and purports to rely 
on the plain meaning of the words “because of.”96 The opinion did not 
grapple with whether the “but for” standard furthers the goals of the 
ADEA.97 The opinion also stated that the plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving “but for” cause because this is the typical way burdens are 
allocated in litigation.98 If Congress wanted to upset this typical allocation, 
it is required to explicitly do so.99 This statement is strange given that Price 
Waterhouse allocated burdens differently without an express statutory 
provision and that tort law also allows for burdens to be allocated 
differently in some scenarios. 
The Supreme Court also invoked common law tort principles in Staub 
v. Proctor Hospital, in which the Court interpreted the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) as containing a 
proximate cause element, even though the statute does not use the term 
“proximate cause.”100 The Court’s short analysis began with the statement: 
“[W]e start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it 
adopts the background of general tort law.”101  
Staub used two common law ideas: intent and proximate cause. The 
Court noted that intent requires a person to intend the consequences of his 
actions or believe that consequences are substantially certain to occur.102 
The Court also cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts and cases that 
relied on common law proximate cause arguments to define proximate 
cause in the USERRA context.103 Lower courts have applied and are likely 
to keep applying this reasoning in the Title VII context because in the 
                                                                                                                     
 95. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351–52 (indicating that Price Waterhouse should not be extended to 
the ADEA because the current Supreme Court Justices may not resolve the question the same way 
and because its framework is unworkable).  
 96. See id. at 2350 (defining the phrase by referring to 1 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1966), 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 746 (1933), and THE 
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 132 (1966)). 
 97. Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that “but for” cause is problematic in cases involving 
motives rather than physical forces. Id. at 2358–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He also recognized that 
the defendant is in the better position to understand why an employment decision is made. Id. at 
2359. 
 98. Id. at 2351 (majority opinion).  
 99. Id.  
 100. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190–92 (2011). 
 101. Id. at 1191. 
 102. Id. at 1191, 1192 & n.2. 
 103. Id. at 1192 & n.2 (citing Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of N.Y., 130 S. Ct. 983, 989 (2010), 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 704 (2005), and Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 
U.S. 830, 837 (1996)). 
14
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/3
2014] THE TORT LABEL 1065 
 
Staub decision, the Supreme Court emphasized the similarities between 
USERRA and Title VII.104 
The Staub case has been particularly effective at connecting tort law 
and employment law. In 2011, the EEOC issued regulations about how 
disparate impact claims would proceed under the ADEA. The EEOC cited 
Staub as a basis for importing tort principles into this analysis.105 The 
EEOC cryptically noted that it was not adopting tort law wholesale, but 
using it for guidance.106 It then cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts for 
the propositions that greater care should be exercised if greater harm 
exists107 and “whether an employer knew or reasonably should have known 
of measures that would reduce harm informs the reasonableness of the 
employer’s choices.”108  
The Nassar case continued this trend. In that case, the Court determined 
whether a plaintiff proceeding on a Title VII retaliation claim is required to 
establish “but for” cause.109 As with Gross, the opinion partially relied on 
the complex relationship between past Supreme Court precedents and the 
1991 amendments to Title VII.110 However, this does not detract from the 
importance of the role of torts in this case. Once the Court decides not to 
follow Price Waterhouse and the 1991 amendments to Title VII, it must 
make a choice regarding what the causation standard should be. The choice 
the Court makes—“but for” cause—is largely driven by the majority 
opinion’s narrow view of tort law and by Gross, which also relied on tort 
law.111 
Nassar invoked tort law from the beginning of the opinion, defining the 
case as one involving causation and then noting that causation inquiries 
most commonly arise in tort cases.112 The majority engaged in a lengthy 
discussion of causation’s role in tort law, with numerous citations to the 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Id. at 1191; Davis v. Omni-Care, Inc., No. 10-3806, 2012 WL 1959367, at *109 & n.8 
(6th Cir. June 1, 2012); Jajeh v. Cnty. of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 572 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 105. Disparate Impact and Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 19,080, 19083 (Mar. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1625) [hereinafter EEOC Regulations]. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 19089 & n.71 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 298 cmt. b (1965) for 
the proposition that “[t]he greater the danger, the greater the care which must be exercised”). 
 108. Id. at 19089–90, 19090 n.73 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292 cmt. c 
(1965) for the proposition that “[i]f the actor can advance or protect his interest as adequately by 
other conduct which involves less risk of harm to others, the risk contained in his conduct is clearly 
unreasonable”). 
 109. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522–23 (2013). 
 110. See id. at 2525–28; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348–50 (2009). 
 111. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525–28, 2534; Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350. 
 112. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522.  
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Restatement and a torts treatise.113  
The Court indicated that “textbook tort law” requires “but for” cause.114 
As discussed throughout this Article, this is a woefully inaccurate account 
of tort law, which allows for substantial cause as an option in multiple 
sufficient cause cases. The Court noted the possibility of multiple 
sufficient causes, indicated that these cases are rare in tort law, and then 
failed to explain why retaliation claims would always require “but for” 
cause.115 
The Court’s use of the Restatement to justify the “but for” standard is 
especially problematic. The Court cited Restatement of Torts § 431, 
Comment a (negligence), to support “but for” cause.116 However, the First 
Restatement uses a substantial factor formulation to define cause.117 This 
Restatement reflects a different view of causation than the way it would be 
conceived now. During this time, the question of legal cause combined 
ideas of proximate cause and factual cause. The Court also used 
Restatement sections that apply to negligence claims, even though the 
Court has characterized disparate treatment law as requiring intent.118 The 
Court cited the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm, even though that Restatement did not exist when 
Congress created Title VII’s retaliation provision.119 
Unlike Gross, the Nassar decision did try to grapple with some policy 
implications of the choice of causal standards. The Court chose “but for” 
cause because it claimed that lessening the standard would lead to 
frivolous claims.120 The “but for” standard is being invoked for reasons of 
judicial administration and to purposefully tilt the law in a particular 
direction. 
Together Staub, Gross, and Nassar represent a shift in the way the 
Supreme Court uses tort law. A reliable majority of Justices are 
comfortable using tort law without much additional argument about why 
tort law is appropriate. Tort law is no longer just persuasive authority that 
serves as one source of potential meaning in discrimination cases. Rather, 
the Justices can use tort law to find a specific meaning to particular 
statutory words or ideas. This Article does not argue that this shift happens 
                                                                                                                     
 113. Id. at 2524–25 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 & cmt. b (2010), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (1965), and W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 114. Id. at 2525. 
 115. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 27 & cmt. b (2010)). 
 116. Id. 
 117. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 431 (1934). 
 118. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (1965)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 2531–32. 
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in all cases, but rather that the trend is toward a more automatic and robust 
use of tort law.121 Further, this move to tort law is also occurring at the 
same time the Supreme Court is eschewing modes of pragmatic reasoning 
in favor of textual arguments.122 Thus, the story of the tort label is 
entwined with the rise of textualism. 
Although this Article focuses on the way the Supreme Court has used 
tort law, the lower courts also label discrimination statutes as torts123 and 
apply common law tort reasoning to them.124 Scholars and the EEOC also 
refer to the statutes as torts and use common law reasoning.125 Courts have 
repeatedly claimed that employment discrimination statutes are torts 
explicitly, in dicta, or implicitly by referring to common law tort 
concepts.126 Unfortunately, they have not explained what it means for the 
statutes to be torts.127 
                                                                                                                     
 121. This Article does not argue that tort reasoning is required to reach the results in each of 
these cases. This section makes a descriptive claim about how the Court invokes tort law. 
 122. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (reasoning that a rise in textualist statutory interpretation promotes 
consistency in the judicial decision-making process).  
 123. See, e.g., Wanchik v. Great Lakes Health Plan, Inc., 6 F. App’x 252, 261 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Fenton v. HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 829 (6th Cir. 1999)) (calling Title VII a “statutory 
tort”); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying tort 
doctrine of avoidable consequences); Nolan v. Duffy Connors LLP, 542 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433–
34 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (discussing Title VII and the ADEA in concluding that the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act “creates statutory torts that cover the same types of harms as its federal cousins”). But 
see EEOC v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Title VII is not a 
fault-based tort scheme. Title VII is aimed at the consequences or effects of an employment practice 
and not at the . . . motivation of co-workers or employers.” (alterations in original) (quoting Ellison 
v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 124. See, e.g., United States v. Vulcan Soc’y, Inc., 897 F.2d 30, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 125. See, e.g., EEOC Regulations, supra note 105, at 19083; John C.P. Goldberg, The 
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 
115 YALE L.J. 524, 597 (2005); Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile 
Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 519–20 (2002); Mark C. Weber, Beyond 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 
495, 538 (1990). 
 126. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.10 (1974) (“An action to redress racial 
discrimination may also be likened to an action for defamation or intentional infliction of mental 
distress. Indeed, the contours of the latter tort are still developing, and it has been suggested that 
‘under the logic of the common law development of a law of insult and indignity, racial 
discrimination might be treated as a dignitary tort.’” (quoting CHARLES O. GREGORY & HARRY 
KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 961 (2d ed. 1969))); see also Comm’r v. Schleier, 
515 U.S. 323, 333 (1995) (accepting for sake of argument that an ADEA claim is a tort claim or a 
tort-type claim); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 254 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(referring to Title VII as a “tort-like cause of action”); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683 (1983) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (referring to “but for” causation)); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 
427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (referring to “but for” causation). 
 127. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (declaring that Title 
VII defines wrongs that are a kind of tort without providing any supporting explanation). 
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II.  THE AT-WILL EXCEPTION AND PRECEDENT PROBLEMS 
The prior Part shows how modern Supreme Court cases use tort law in 
discrimination cases. The following sections detail serious mistakes in this 
statutory analysis. This Part discusses how the Supreme Court fails to 
consider that the discrimination statutes’ status as an exception to at-will 
employment affects the use of tort common law. The Supreme Court also 
does not grapple with the fact that the first decades of statutory analysis did 
not occur through the lens of tort law. 
Let’s assume that a court wants to discover the meaning of the term 
“because of” under a discrimination statute. Even if the court characterizes 
the statute as a tort, the automatic use of tort law would never be 
appropriate. This is because federal discrimination law created a large 
exception to prior common law norms about the employment relationship. 
At common law, the employment relationship is defined by the concept 
of at-will employment. Absent a contract or contrary law, at-will 
employment allows an employer to hire, fire, or change the conditions of 
employment for any reason or no reason.128 Many states have developed 
their own exceptions to at-will employment.129 In most states, without the 
existence of federal employment discrimination laws or a corollary state 
statute, the common law would allow the employer to terminate an 
individual based on a protected trait, such as sex or race.130 The 
employment discrimination statutes created large exceptions to common 
law notions of at-will employment.131 Any analysis that purports to 
integrate common law principles with the discrimination statutes must 
recognize and account for this foundational aspect of the discrimination 
statutes. This central aspect of discrimination law weighs strongly against 
the use of the common law as the automatic and primary source of 
statutory meaning. 
When courts are faced with a question about the meaning of a particular 
word or concept in a discrimination statute, before applying tort common 
law, the court must first consider whether Congress’s rejection of portions 
of the common law affects the intersection of tort law and discrimination 
law. Failure to do this represents a gross misunderstanding about the 
intersection of federal discrimination law and the common law. It is 
                                                                                                                     
 128. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 604 (9th ed. 2009). 
 129. See Employment At-Will Exceptions by State, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-exceptions
-by-state.aspx (last visited June 26, 2014) (providing a list of states with corresponding at-will 
employment exceptions). For example, Montana has a statute that abrogates, in part, the at-will 
doctrine regarding certain terminations. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (2013). 
 130. Howard v. Wolff Broad. Corp., 611 So. 2d 307, 312–13 (Ala. 1992). 
 131. Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 2, at 70 (discussing how Title VII abrogates common law 
understandings of employment).  
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/3
2014] THE TORT LABEL 1069 
 
absolutely clear that the discrimination statutes do not call for a wholesale 
use of the common law because to do so would eradicate the statutes’ main 
protections. This key fact creates difficult interpretive questions if one 
assumes tort common law should apply to discrimination statutes. If 
Congress meant to alter the common law relationship in a significant way, 
did it also mean to fully retain common law meanings for core statutory 
words? If so, which words and concepts retained their common law 
meanings and how are these meanings changed by the limits Congress 
imposed on employers’ ability to make decisions based on protected traits? 
Staub, Gross, and Nassar all fail to make this key inquiry. In Staub, the 
Court failed to ask whether Congress’s creation of an antidiscrimination 
exception to the common law altered whether the Court should apply 
proximate cause to the statute at all, or created a different version of 
proximate cause that is not coterminous with the common law.132 It also 
failed to consider whether common law ideas of intent are appropriate in 
the discrimination context.133 In Gross and Nassar, the Court failed to 
consider whether the factual cause inquiry should be different in 
discrimination cases because the ADEA and Title VII reject portions of the 
common law.134 
Indeed, there are certain pockets of antidiscrimination obligation that 
are so contrary to tort law that it is difficult to imagine how using tort law 
would be doctrinally or theoretically satisfying. Consider, for example, 
religious or disability accommodation. It is difficult to conceive how tort 
principles developed in the context of strict liability, negligence, or 
intentional torts could be applied wholesale to these claims. Both religious 
and disability accommodation cases require affirmative conduct by the 
employer that is unlike duties tort law imposes on employers. In the 
disability context, employers are required to engage in an interactive 
process to assist the employee in developing a work environment that 
reasonably accommodates the employee’s disability. These claims are so 
different from tort law that their very existence undermines the argument 
that the discrimination statutes are torts. 
Another interpretive issue arises from the fact that the Supreme Court 
did not typically invoke tort law in early discrimination cases. The 
disparate impact theory and its elements are not derived from tort law. The 
multi-step McDonnell Douglas test135 does not stem from tort law. The 
plurality in Price Waterhouse rejected traditional common law 
                                                                                                                     
 132. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191–92 (2011); see also id. at 1193–94. 
 133. See id. at 1191–92. 
 134. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350–51 (2009); Univ. of Tex. Sw. 
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 135. For an articulation of the test, see supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
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formulations of cause and imposed a two-tiered analysis.136 Any later 
attempts to imbue the discrimination statutes with a torts sensibility must 
contend with foundational opinions not grounded in tort doctrine or theory. 
Recent attempts to force discrimination statutes into a torts mold are 
awkward because they ignore that the foundational cases in discrimination 
law are not based in tort law. 
III.  INTERPRETIVE DILEMMAS 
Let’s assume that courts could overcome the difficulties discussed in 
the prior section and find that certain statutory terms or concepts are not 
affected by discrimination statutes’ relationship with the common law or 
prior precedent. Even then, it is still hard to equate discrimination terms 
and concepts with common law analogs. Discrimination statutes’ text and 
architecture do not mimic common law torts, and discrimination concepts 
do not map onto tort concepts well. The Court also has failed to recognize 
the relational nature of tort concepts—that the meaning of words are not 
static, but rather depend on the surrounding elements of the tort.  
A.  The Language and Structure Problem 
Neither the language nor the structure of discrimination statutes mimics 
tort law. The discrimination statutes do not use tort terms of art. The main 
operative provisions of Title VII and the ADEA do not use the words 
intent, factual cause, proximate cause, or damages, which are key words 
used in tort causes of action. Congress has used these terms of art in other 
statutes and thus knows how to specifically invoke tort principles when it 
wants to do so.137  
Even the words “because of” are, at best, an ambiguous reference to tort 
law. Tort causes of action typically do not define causation inquiries using 
the term “because of.”138 Thus, when Congress used the words “because 
of,” it is textually possible that Congress did not intend a common law 
meaning.  
The discrimination statutes are not structured like the elements of 
traditional torts. Tort law has developed a preference for a small set of 
central elements that define each cause of action. Take, for example, the 
traditional articulation of the elements of negligence as a breach of a duty 
                                                                                                                     
 136. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). 
 137. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2006) (providing that plaintiffs may recover damages in 
excess of prescribed caps if a showing of proximate cause is made); Federal Employees’ 
Compensation Act, ch. 458, 39 Stat. 742–43 (1916) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8102 
(2006)) (providing that the United States shall not be liable to an injured employee whose 
“intoxication . . . is the proximate cause of the injury”). 
 138. See, e.g., Taylor v. Fishkind, 51 A.3d 743, 759 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012). 
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that causes damages.139 The original operative language of Title VII is 
divided into two core provisions, which are facially more complex than the 
elements of tort claims.140 As discussed in more detail below, Title VII is 
further complicated by the 1991 amendments to the statute, in which 
Congress added additional language regarding disparate impact claims and 
further defined the causal inquiry.141 
There are numerous instances where Congress could have easily chosen 
language to mimic traditional tort law, but did not. In 1991, when Congress 
amended Title VII to make it clear that plaintiffs were not initially required 
to establish “but for” causation, Congress chose to define the plaintiff’s 
burden as establishing that the plaintiff’s protected trait played a 
“motivating factor” in the employment decision.142 This motivating factor 
language is different than the substantial factor language used at the 
common law.143 The affirmative defense that Congress approved for 
motivating factor cases is a limited affirmative defense for damages, rather 
than liability.144 When Congress defined compensatory damages under 
Title VII, it provided a narrower definition of these damages than that 
imposed by common law.145 The damages provision for the ADEA, which 
is modeled from the Fair Labor Standards Act,146 provides only limited 
remedies and not the full panoply of damages that would be available at 
common law.147 
Likewise, the defenses available for discrimination cases do not mimic 
the common law. Congress provided instances where the employer would 
be excused from liability, even when conduct might otherwise appear to be 
discriminatory. For example, an employer may escape liability under Title 
VII if a protected trait is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).148 
An employer may implement bona fide seniority systems.149 Under the 
ADEA, an employer may make age-based employment decisions for 
certain executives and policymakers.150 Given these provisions, it is odd to 
assume that provisions in the discrimination statutes are coterminous with 
tort law. 
                                                                                                                     
 139. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 71 (2014). 
140.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
141.  See supra Part I.B (discussing 1991 amendments). 
 142. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 143. See, e.g., Taylor, 51 A.3d at 759. 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2). 
 146. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
 147. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). 
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). 
 150. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1). 
21
Sperino: The Tort Label
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1072 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
The substantial number of statutory provisions that do not mimic tort 
common law raises another challenge to textual tort analysis. The Supreme 
Court does not consider how these non-tort provisions affect the claim that 
some words nonetheless retain a tort meaning.  
B.  The Mapping Problem 
For purposes of this section, assume that the tort universe consists of 
three kinds of torts—intentional, negligence, and strict liability—that these 
torts are defined by their core elements, that these torts remain unchanged 
by statutory torts, and that these torts are concerned with limited types of 
harm. For lack of a better terminology, this section refers to such a view of 
tort law as a traditional view. Even if we artificially limit tort law to these 
contours, it still proves unsatisfactory in answering discrimination 
questions. Discrimination law’s analytical frameworks do not have direct 
analogs in tort law. 
The Supreme Court has described different frameworks for analyzing 
discrimination cases, which the courts divide into two broad categories: 
disparate treatment and disparate impact.151 Disparate treatment cases are 
further subdivided into individual disparate treatment, harassment, and 
pattern or practice cases.152  
Within the individual disparate treatment category, some courts further 
subdivide cases into direct evidence and circumstantial evidence cases.153 
The courts also often categorize individual disparate treatment cases as 
either single-motive or mixed-motive.154 Cases that involve explicitly 
discriminatory policies or conduct are called direct evidence cases and are 
analyzed under a fairly simple formulation, requiring a plaintiff to establish 
that a decision was taken because of a protected trait.155  
                                                                                                                     
 151. See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and 
the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (2009) (“Few 
propositions are less controversial or more embedded in the structure of Title VII analysis than that 
the statute recognizes only ‘disparate treatment’ and ‘disparate impact’ theories of employment 
discrimination.” (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993))). 
 152. Id. at 1414 (discussing the subdivision into individual disparate treatment and harassment 
cases); accord Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348–49 (1977) (discussing 
Congress’s proscription of discriminatory policies or practices). 
 153. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (explaining that 
when direct evidence of discrimination is available, the burden-shifting framework articulated in 
McDonnell Douglas does not apply); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 & n.44 (explaining that direct 
evidence is not required under the McDonnell Douglas framework). 
 154. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989). The author strongly disagrees 
with the way courts characterize discrimination claims. These paragraphs are meant to be 
descriptive only.  
 155. See, e.g., Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2000) (indicating 
that a company policy of discrimination constitutes direct evidence).  
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Plaintiffs who do not have direct evidence and who allege 
discrimination was the cause of their harm often proceed through the three-
part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.156 So-called Title VII 
mixed-motive cases, which involve claims where both legitimate and 
discriminatory reasons caused an action, are analyzed using the statutory 
language added in the 1991 amendments.157 Harassment cases are analyzed 
under a multiple-part framework developed by the courts.158 The plaintiff 
must prove the harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.”159 Pattern or practices cases usually involve claims by 
numerous individuals that the defendant had an actual policy of 
discrimination or that its conduct demonstrated that discrimination was the 
norm.160 
Outside of the intentional discrimination context, courts have 
recognized disparate impact claims. Disparate impact occurs when a 
specific employment practice creates a disproportionate impact on a 
protected group unless the defendant can prove an affirmative defense, 
which differs by statutory regime. Under Title VII, the defendant can 
prevail if it can demonstrate that the practice is job-related and consistent 
with business necessity.161 Under the ADEA, the defendant can prevail if it 
demonstrates that the practice was based on a reasonable factor other than 
age (RFOA).162 
To apply common law tort principles to discrimination law, it is 
necessary to determine whether discrimination law mimics a traditional 
tort pocket of obligation. This is because common law torts vary markedly 
in the interests they protect and their underlying goals. None of the 
traditionally recognized discrimination types maps well onto traditional 
torts.  
                                                                                                                     
 156. See, e.g., Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2011). This is not always 
the case. See, e.g., Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2009) (allowing 
a plaintiff to make a case of discrimination without resorting to McDonnell Douglas if the plaintiff 
has “either direct or circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of intentional 
discrimination”); Taylor v. Peerless Indus. Inc., 322 F. App’x 355, 360 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying a 
modified McDonnell Douglas framework). 
 157. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009). The Supreme Court 
held that “but-for” cause is required under the ADEA. Id. at 2352. This question has not been 
definitively resolved in the ADA context. 
 158. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986). 
 159. Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 160. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348–49 (1977). 
 161. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). A plaintiff can also prevail in a disparate 
impact case under Title VII if it can demonstrate that the employer could have used alternate 
business practices that would not have resulted in the disparity. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). This 
option is not available under the ADEA. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005). 
 162. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 91 (2008); see also id. at 92–93. 
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First, consider disparate treatment law. It could plausibly be argued that 
disparate treatment cases are like intentional torts because both require the 
establishment of intent. However, this comparison is only true in a general 
sense because it ignores two important factors: whether individual 
disparate treatment cases actually require a showing of intent and whether 
the intent required is similar to the type required in intentional tort cases. 
Describing the intent necessary for traditional common law intentional 
torts is not an easy task. However, it is possible to rely on rudimentary 
descriptions of this intent to show the difficulty of importing the common 
law into employment discrimination cases. Common law intent is often 
described as being concerned with the subjective state of the actor, which 
is ascertained from the available evidence. The defendant is liable if he 
engaged in a volitional act that he knew or with a substantial certainty 
knew would cause interference with other people or property.163 Some torts 
impose a higher intent requirement, essentially requiring something like 
mens rea.164 Importantly, tort law offers numerous options regarding how 
intent can be defined. 
Scholars disagree on whether disparate treatment cases require a 
showing of intent, both as a descriptive and a normative matter.165 Even if 
it is possible to say that, as a descriptive matter, courts require plaintiffs to 
establish intent in disparate treatment cases, this intent standard is itself 
inconsistent. When some courts describe intent, they describe it as 
requiring animus,166 which seems more akin to the higher mens rea-like 
requirement imposed for a few intentional torts. However, it appears that 
the courts have largely rejected an argument that the defendant could be 
liable for intentional discrimination if it knew with substantial certainty 
that its actions were causing differential treatment based on a protected 
trait.167 Thus, the current concept of intent in employment discrimination 
cases fits uncomfortably within traditional tort descriptions of intent.  
                                                                                                                     
 163. Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093–94 (Wash. 1955). The exact articulation of intent 
varies depending on the intentional tort at issue.  
 164. Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort Concepts Reveal 
About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 278–79 (2008). 
 165. See, e.g., id. at 270–71; David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. 
PA. L. REV. 899, 919–20 (1993); Stacey E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved 
with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1141, 1145 (2007); Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate 
Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1118, 1136–37 (1991). See generally Rebecca 
Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor 
Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495 (2001) (analyzing the intent requirement in the 
context of both vertical and horizontal decision-making processes). 
 166. See, e.g., Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1189, 1191–92 (2011). 
 167. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552–56 (2011). 
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It is at least possible to state that most intentional discrimination cases, 
at least descriptively, are not negligence cases. To date, the courts have not 
embraced arguments that plaintiffs may establish a discrimination claim 
via a negligence analysis.168 Despite this, courts have used the tort label to 
apply negligence-based concepts to the discrimination statutes, failing to 
recognize that such concepts may not fit well if discrimination law is not 
perceived as a negligence regime.169 
Disparate impact shares traits with strict liability and negligence, 
depending on how the plaintiff would prevail in a given suit.170 In some 
cases, a plaintiff may prevail by establishing a particular employment 
practice created a large disparity based on a protected trait, if the employer 
is not able to establish an affirmative defense to liability.171 In Title VII 
cases, the defendant may prevail by showing that its practice was job-
related and consistent with business necessity.172 The defendant is liable 
whether or not it intended to create the disparity, and even if it took 
reasonable measures to try to prevent it. Thus, these cases share 
commonalities with strict liability. In Title VII cases, a plaintiff may also 
prevail by establishing that the employer could have adopted alternate 
practices that would not result in a disparity, but chose not to do so.173 
These cases sound more like negligence as the employer is being held 
liable for its failure to take reasonable care to prevent disparate results.174 
Even though disparate impact might share some traits with traditional 
torts, the analogy is still inapt. The substantive standard requires the 
plaintiff to identify the specific employment practice at issue and that 
                                                                                                                     
 168. See, e.g., Aaron v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 3:08CV1471, 2009 WL 803586, at *2 
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2009) (“He also alleges Defendant was merely ‘negligent’ in its hiring 
practices, which does not rise to the standard of intentional discrimination required by Title VII.”); 
Jalal v. Columbia Univ., 4 F. Supp. 2d 224, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Title VII, however, provides no 
remedy for negligent discrimination . . . .”). See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 165 (arguing 
that negligent discrimination should form the basis of an action under Title VII). Courts do 
recognize employer liability for negligence where the employer has failed to take action to prevent 
or correct harassment; however, that liability depends on there first being a showing of harassment. 
See, e.g., Zarazed v. Spar Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-2621, 2006 WL 224050, at *7 (E.D. 
Pa. Jan. 27, 2006). For an interesting discussion of how Title VII already incorporates a negligence 
standard, see Zatz, supra note 151, at 1364.  
 169. See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191–92. See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination 
Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. 
 170. Oppenheimer, supra note 165, at 931–36. 
 171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
 174. Oppenheimer, supra note 165, at 931–36. 
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practice must be tied to a specific kind of outcome.175 Further, courts 
require significant statistical proof regarding disparity based on a protected 
trait.176 Even if disparate impact could be analogized to certain kinds of 
torts, it is not proven like a traditional tort. Further, disparate impact is 
imbued with court judgments about how discrimination happens and how 
employers should be liable for societal discrimination. 
Discrimination claims are also an imperfect fit with traditional torts 
because of the kinds of harms that are protected at common law. 
Discrimination claims outside of the harassment context often do not 
involve physical injury.177 Indeed, it is difficult to define the harms of 
discrimination in a singular way. The harms of discrimination are often 
economic in nature but also involve harms to personal dignity, equality 
norms, and group harms. As Professor Martha Chamallas has noted, “such 
claims often articulate a type of injury—disproportionately experienced by 
members of subordinated groups—that cannot be pinned down as 
psychological, economic, or physical in nature, or as either individual or 
group based.”178 The “multidimensional quality of the harm” in harassment 
cases “defies categorization under traditional headings” and makes it 
problematic to map traditional tort causes of action onto discrimination.179 
Statutes also impose accommodation duties.180 For example, an 
employer is required to accommodate certain religious beliefs and 
practices.181 Under the ADA, employers also are required to accommodate 
employees with disabilities.182 Accommodation law is perhaps the farthest 
from the common law given its affirmative obligations not only to avoid 
harm but also to alter environments and policies.  
It is difficult to argue that specific words in the discrimination statutes 
have tort meaning when the ways plaintiffs prove discrimination claims 
and the ways employers defend these claims do not map well onto any tort 
cause of action. There is no way of proving discrimination claims that fully 
                                                                                                                     
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Under Title VII, a plaintiff may allege that combined 
practices created a disparate impact if the plaintiff can show that the practices are not capable of 
separation. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). 
 176. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140, 1146 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(noting the rule that statistical evidence must reveal “a disparity so great that it cannot reasonably be 
attributed to chance”). 
 177. Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort 
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2140 (2007). 
 178. Id. at 2147. 
 179. Id. at 2146–47. 
 180. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79–81, 83 n.14 (1977) (discussing 
the employer’s obligation under Title VII to make some effort to accommodate an employee’s 
religious beliefs in certain circumstances). 
 181. Id. 
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2006) (defining discrimination under the ADA as a failure to 
provide reasonable accommodations). 
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mimics an intentional tort, a strict liability tort, or a negligence tort. 
Disparate impact claims and accommodation claims are so far outside the 
realm of traditional torts that their presence within the discrimination 
canon is a sharp rebuke to the claim that the discrimination statutes are 
common law torts. As one commentator noted in the criminal law context: 
Principles of legal reasoning and jurisprudential legitimacy 
counsel that the use of analogy and precedent in judicial 
decisions be grounded in reasoning that is by some measure a 
“fit” with the matter before the Court. This imperative, and 
the companion norm that some explanation be provided to 
justify reliance on indirectly applicable legal authority, is only 
enhanced when a court draws from outside the immediate 
doctrinal domain in which a case dwells.183 
Simply put, the automatic application of tort law to the core substantive 
provisions of the discrimination statutes is not appropriate because 
discrimination claims share no direct analog to any traditional tort. 
C.  The Relational Aspect of Torts 
References to general tort law or even references to specific pockets of 
tort obligation are unsatisfactory because they fail to recognize the 
relational nature of tort doctrine. Tort elements are relational in the sense 
that their meaning is not independent but depends on the goals of the 
underlying tort and the other elements of the tort claim.  
The common law of torts is an evolving doctrine that responds to 
different policies and goals, depending on the underlying pocket of 
obligation. Core concepts such as duty and fault define how ancillary 
doctrines respond. And these ancillary doctrines are often specific to 
certain kinds of torts or to specific pockets of obligation. Given these 
differences, concepts that apply to one type of tort may not apply at all or 
in the same way as the concept would be applied to another type of tort. 
This is true even though courts may use the same words to describe the 
underlying concepts. Tort causes of action are “like a group of individuals 
sharing family resemblances, with remote cousins looking quite different 
than siblings.”184 
Judge Guido Calabresi evocatively describes this point in the following 
passage: 
                                                                                                                     
 183. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 703–04 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
 184. JOEL LEVIN, TORT WARS 1 (2008) (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS § 67 (1953)). 
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[C]ourts have been able to hold two faulty, independent 
hunters both liable in cases like Summers v. Tice, even though 
only one of their shots hit the victim and even though a 
showing of but for cause was supposedly a prerequisite for 
liability. They would not as readily have found two equally 
faulty independent rapists to be the fathers of an illegitimate 
child—even though the causal evidence as to the wrongdoing 
was precisely the same as in Summers v. Tice and even though 
the victim was equally innocent. Rightly or wrongly, the 
effects (and hence the function) of paternity actions are 
conceived to be very different from those of money damage 
claims for injuries. What is “cause” for one need not be 
“cause” for the other.185  
Even when verbal formulations are similar, courts often apply different 
standards depending on the underlying conduct and motivations of the 
parties.186  
Further, over time, courts can cling to the same legal language but 
fundamentally reframe the underlying inquiry to change the overall 
outcome of cases.187 Professor Suzanna Sherry describes how judges may 
change the underlying assumption on which doctrine is based without any 
facial recognition of underlying shifts in the law.188  
Consider the question of whether to apply a particular causation 
standard to a statute. In the employment discrimination context, courts are 
considering what type of causation is imbedded in a statute by interpreting 
terms such as “because of.” There are several tort standards for causation, 
and the importance of causation within tort law varies depending on the 
type of tort involved.189 It is impossible to look at generic causal language 
                                                                                                                     
 185. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, 
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 106 (1975) (citations omitted). 
 186. Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249, 260 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (describing different factors that 
might affect substantive reasonableness standards). 
 187. MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, 
AND TORT LAW 132–33 (2010) (discussing how courts used the “but-for” causation standard in 
wrongful birth cases but reframed the causal inquiry over time to allow plaintiffs to proceed on 
claims). 
 188. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145, 
147, 159–60 (discussing how the Supreme Court uses the term “strict scrutiny” with different 
meanings depending on changed facts without recognizing any underlying change in doctrine).  
 189. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 33 (2010) (discussing how in some jurisdictions proximate cause plays a diminished role in 
intentional tort cases); Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement, 64 VAND. 
L. REV. 675, 721–26 (2011) (discussing “but for” and “substantial factor” causal standards); Jill E. 
Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 832 
(2009) ( “In cases involving fraud . . . . [c]ourts rarely consider proximate cause extensively.”). 
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and determine which kind of causation the statute provides because 
“[c]ausation issues are colored . . . by issues of responsibility and harm that 
connect to it on either side.”190 Any claims that the analysis is a pure tort 
analysis should be viewed with suspicion.191  
Words in tort law have different meanings given the underlying legal 
claim and factual circumstances. “The real explanation has to be completed 
in every case from the policies and values underlying the recognition of the 
primary duty which is in question.”192 Courts applying the tort label often 
fail to see this key point.  
For example, in Gross, the Court reasoned that the terms “because of” 
means “but for” causation.193 However, the common law actually has a 
richer, more nuanced view of causation. While “but for” cause may be the 
dominant way of thinking about negligence causation, the substantial 
factor test can also be used, including in discrimination cases.194 In other 
words, the common law adjusts the causal standard in circumstances where 
“but for” causation does not work. Further, the common law allows the 
burden of persuasion on causation to shift to the defendant in certain cases 
when there are policy or other reasons to make the shift.195 Even in the 
narrow context of factual cause, the Supreme Court has numerous choices 
to make about which causal standard to impose and upon which party to 
impose it. Further, the causal inquiry is not of key importance in 
intentional tort cases, where proof of intent lessens the need for a focus on 
causation.196 The Supreme Court should at least consider these possibilities 
in discrimination cases, where the employer has the best access to 
                                                                                                                     
 190. David G. Owen, Foreword to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 
186, at 1, 18. 
 191. Often, concepts in tort law are also relational in the sense that they depend on the 
underlying relationship between the parties. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The 
Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 707 (2001). 
Take for example the duty owed to persons on land. The duty owed depends on whether the person 
is a trespasser, an invitee, or a child. See id. at 670 (providing examples of relational concepts). At 
times, the necessary relationship is stated in the primary rule, but at other times, a decision maker 
would need to understand the entire scope of a rule and its exceptions to understand relational 
concepts. Likewise, questions of when a party will be held liable for the actions of others highly 
depend on the relationship between the parties. 
 192. Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT 
LAW, supra note 186, at 31, 51. Further, tort law often changes, depending on other structures that 
support similar goals. The most common of these systems are systems of mandatory or optional 
insurance. Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort 
Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 27–29 (1980). 
 193. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
 194. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249–50 (1989); see also 
Bartholomew & McArdle, supra note 189, at 724–25. 
 195. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56 (1981). 
 196. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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information about its decision-making, where multiple individuals often 
make decisions, and where it may be difficult for the plaintiff to tease apart 
varying motives for a particular act. 
Careful analysis also would require courts to examine whether 
Congress has already spoken to the underlying concerns in other ways. To 
date, courts have often failed to do this. Rather, when they apply the tort 
label, they look narrowly at a particular word used in the common law and 
import common law ideas, without considering whether the statute 
addresses those same concerns elsewhere. As discussed earlier, modern 
statutes are not typically constructed out of the same handful of elements as 
traditional tort law. Thus, ideas such as cause and harm can be expressed 
throughout statutory regimes and can be addressed in numerous ways that 
do not mimic common law articulations of these same ideas. Courts that 
fixate on one common law term and thereby import meaning into a statute 
risk ignoring congressional expressions related to the underlying concern 
expressed throughout a statutory regime. 
IV.  WHAT TORT LAW IS (AND IS NOT) 
When the Supreme Court uses the tort label, it also overestimates the 
work that tort law can do in answering statutory questions. Labeling a 
statute as a tort does not provide a meaningful answer to most statutory 
interpretation questions. This Part describes how the definition of torts, its 
theory, and its doctrine do not provide meaningful assistance with statutory 
interpretation because they do not provide courts with a workably 
determinate set of options or direction on how to choose between conflicts 
within those options.197  
It does this by showing what tort law is, and importantly, what it is not. 
Tort law is an area that coheres around few central concepts and does not 
contain a core guiding theoretical principle or principles. Importantly, this 
Part discusses why the idea of a general tort law is a fallacy. Even if one 
looks to specific tort doctrines or concepts, such as causation, these smaller 
units of tort law are relational and thus provide little help in answering 
statutory questions. 
An example of the type of reasoning this Article contests is the kind 
found in the Staub case. In that case the Supreme Court declared: “[W]e 
start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts 
the background of general tort law.”198 The Court then cited the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts and cases that relied on common law 
proximate cause arguments to define proximate cause in the USERRA 
                                                                                                                     
 197. Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF  
TORT LAW, supra note 186, at 159, 159–60. 
 198. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011). 
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context.199 In doing so, it ignored the contested definition of proximate 
cause, its varying application to different kinds of torts, and its evolution 
over time.200  
A.  The Definition of “Torts” 
Tort law can be defined as being “about the wrongs that a private 
litigant must establish to entitle her to a court’s assistance in obtaining a 
remedy and the remedies that will be made available to her.”201 Another 
common definition of a tort is a “civil wrong, other than breach of contract, 
for which the court will provide a remedy.”202 A less litigation-centric 
definition of torts is that the “law of torts concerns the obligations of 
persons living in a crowded society to respect the safety, property, and 
personality of their neighbors, both as an a priori matter and as a duty to 
compensate for wrongfully cased harm, ex post.”203 
Many modern statutes could properly be classified as torts in these 
general senses. However, it is important to realize that none of these 
definitions are helpful in answering most, if any, statutory interpretation 
questions. As Professor Max Radin noted, it is of little value to label a tort 
as “something that is actionable but is neither a contract nor a quasi-
contract.”204 It is necessary to look beyond these general definitions to 
determine the central features of tort law. 
The torts literature describes five universal and fairly noncontroversial 
aspects of tort law. First, tort law is unlike criminal law, in that the remedy 
does not include imprisonment and the state is not the actor solely 
responsible for prosecuting the action. Second, tort law is a means of social 
control that attempts to reduce undesirable conduct. In contrast with some 
other forms of social control, tort law accomplishes this goal by “marking 
out conduct, or the failure to attain a required standard of conduct, as 
wrongful.”205 This aspect is subject to the caveat that, at times, 
                                                                                                                     
 199. Id. at 1192 & n.2 (citing Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of N.Y., 130 S. Ct. 983, 989 (2010), 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 704 (2005), and Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 
U.S. 830, 837 (1996)). 
 200. Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1199, 1220, 
1234–35 (2013). 
 201. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 919 
(2010). One of the leading torts treatises explains that “a really satisfactory definition of a tort is yet 
to be found.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 113, § 1 at 1. 
 202. KEETON ET AL., supra note 113, § 1 at 2. 
 203. David G. Owen, Foreword to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 
186, at 7. 
 204. Max Radin, A Speculative Inquiry into the Nature of Torts, 21 TEX. L. REV. 697, 698–99 
(1943). 
 205. Tony Honoré, The Morality of Tort Law—Questions and Answers, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 186, at 78. 
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nonwrongful conduct is discouraged in tort regimes, such as harm-causing 
dangerous activities in strict liability or legal activities in nuisance cases.  
Third, absent contractual waiver, tort law allows a party access to some 
state-sanctioned system (often a court system) to both avert and seek 
compensation for tortious conduct.206 Fourth, tort law typically involves an 
obligation of a liable defendant to compensate the plaintiff for harm.207 
Fifth, tort law often allows for the possible recovery of compensatory 
damages.208  
Just like the general definitions of tort law, these unifying aspects of 
tort law are not helpful in answering most, if any, interpretation questions 
related to employment discrimination. These central aspects do not define 
the duties owed, the relationships that must exist between parties, or the 
defenses that may be used to escape liability. These concepts do not tell us 
which parties the law should favor or what interests are being protected. 
The general concept of tort law does not answer who is required to pay for 
the harms and under what mechanisms a person must be compensated. 
B.  Tort Theory 
Labeling statutes as torts does not help ground the statute in a 
theoretical framework. This difficulty relates to three features of tort 
theory. First, tort law lacks a consistent unifying theory or even a 
manageable menu of theoretical considerations. Professor Jules Coleman 
explains the “law of torts is extremely complex and . . . resists simple 
analysis.”209 One commentator describes modern tort law as 
“schizophrenic, at cross-purposes.”210 Second, it is often unclear whether 
tort theory is meant to be descriptive or normative.211 Third, much of the 
theoretical tort work considers certain types of harms, such as personal 
                                                                                                                     
 206. Id. at 77. 
 207. Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 494 (1989). 
 208. Levin, supra note 184, at 1; see also United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 (1992) 
(“Indeed, one of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of 
damages to compensate the plaintiff fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights.” 
(quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Perhaps 
most controversially, many tort theorists describe causation as central to tort law. Honoré, supra 
note 205, at 80; Weinrib, supra note 207, at 494. A general concept of causation is not helpful to 
resolving many statutory questions because it does not describe how close the causal connection 
needs to be and also does not describe when causation alone will be an insufficient basis for 
imposing liability.  
 209. Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 428 
(1982).  
 210. Englard, supra note 192, at 29 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 211. Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 186, at 99, 100 (noting the controversy of the idea that 
wealth maximization is a descriptively adequate way to describe tort law). 
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injury, and it is difficult to understand how this work would  carry over 
into the discrimination context with a more complex harm doctrine.  
Tort law does not have a central theoretical unifying theory, aim, 
principle, or foundation. Professor Michael L. Rustad explains that tort law 
is a “multi-paradigmatic field” that emphasizes a broad range of goals such 
as morality, corrective justice, social utility, and policy.212 Some scholars 
argue that tort law should be grounded in corrective justice, while others 
argue that the dominant consideration should be economic efficiency.213 
Some identify distributive goals as a major facet of modern tort law.214 
Professor Ernest Weinrib describes instrumentalist approaches to tort law 
as “focusing on goals, such as compensation, deterrence, loss-spreading, 
cheapest cost avoidance, or wealth maximization” and whether tort law 
accomplishes them.215 Many scholars concede that the theoretical aspects 
of tort law they prefer do not adequately resolve or describe all aspects of 
tort law.216 Some scholars even celebrate the multiple aims and functions 
of tort law.217  
There is strong disagreement in tort scholarship about the goals and 
functions of tort law.218 Likewise, there is strong disagreement about its 
proper scope. Some scholars posit that tort law allows courts to engage in 
social engineering while others believe torts should return to more limited 
functions.219 Further, it often is difficult to parse the exact line between 
torts and other areas, such as criminal law and contracts.220  
                                                                                                                     
 212. Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 435–36 (2011). 
 213. Coleman, supra note 209, at 421. Some even argue that ideas of corrective justice should 
be grounded in economic principles. Id.; see also Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of 
Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 427, 427 (1992) (noting the tendency to try to ground tort law 
in “one fundamental, overarching principle”). 
 214. See Englard, supra note 192, at 28. 
 215. Weinrib, supra note 207, at 487. 
 216. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 211, at 101. 
 217. See, e.g., Izhak Englard, The Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for 
Pluralism in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 186, at 183, 183.  
 218. See Rustad, supra note 212, at 437–39, 448; John C.P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the 
Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1512 (2002) (“If, for Koenig and Rustad, the 
great thing about tort is that it permits judges and juries to adopt the role of unappointed corporate 
ombudsmen, for Posner the great thing about tort is that it permits judges to act as roving efficiency 
commissioners charged with the task of identifying and achieving the cost-efficient mix of 
precaution and injury.”). See generally Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective 
Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992) (discussing the moral foundation for the fault principle in corrective 
justice); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) (discussing 
the tension between economic and fairness theories of tort as they relate to negligence and strict 
liability theories). 
 219. Rustad, supra note 212, at 437–39, 454. 
 220. Id. at 435–36. 
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Scholars who do agree on the correct theoretical framework for viewing 
tort law often disagree about how to define core concepts within the 
framework.221 Consider a group of individuals who all agree that tort law 
should be driven by cost-benefit analysis. These individuals may still 
possess widely divergent opinions about who is the best party to be liable 
for conduct. Some may want the party best financially able to pay, while 
others may want the loss to fall on parties who can obtain insurance. Some 
cost-benefit advocates may want to maximize utility or promote 
efficiency.222 
Even scholars that agree on the appropriate theoretical construct 
disagree on how much work the construct can do descriptively or 
normatively.223 A tort theory that explains why liability exists may not 
explain who is responsible for compensating for the wrong and under what 
circumstances. It also is unlikely that such a theory would explain how the 
proof requirements for establishing violations should function.224 
The search for a unifying theme becomes more complex because it is 
often unclear whether theoretical arguments are “about the ideal system of 
tort law” or “interpretive accounts of the common law of torts.”225 
Theoretical scholars also disagree on correct accounts of tort law’s history 
and modern practice.226  
Further, much of the theoretical work in tort law addresses a certain 
class of harms, such as personal injury, or a particular type of tort, such as 
negligence.227 And this theoretical work may be incomplete in its 
                                                                                                                     
 221. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 186, at 53, 58 (“Those who have offered corrective justice accounts of 
tort law differ with respect to: (1) the conditions of responsibility; (2) whether in order to invoke 
corrective justice, losses must be wrongful; (3) what makes conduct wrongful within the ambit of 
corrective justice—and more.”); id. at 66 (noting that areas of convergence among corrective justice 
theories of tort law include ideas of human agency, rectification, and correlativity). 
 222. LEVIN, supra note 184, at 45. 
 223. Coleman, supra note 209, at 429 (explaining differences among scholars and 
commentators who agree that tort law can be explained through corrective justice). Coleman 
explains, “Epstein, Fletcher, and myself reach different conclusions regarding the extent to which 
the principle of corrective justice could figure in an adequate theory of liability and recovery in 
torts . . . .” Id. at 435. 
 224. See Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 585, 592–93 (1985). 
 225. George P. Fletcher, The Search for Synthesis in Tort Theory, in TORT LAW 105, 105 
(Ernest J. Weinrib ed., 1991). 
 226. Goldberg, supra note 218, at 1504–06 (providing a history of tort law). See generally 
Rustad, supra note 212 (contesting Professor Goldberg’s historical account); CHAMALLAS & 
WRIGGINS, supra note 187, at 63 (discussing how negligence is considered to be the theoretical and 
practical core of the field and discussing the Restatement’s reference to accidental injury as the core 
problem of tort law). 
 227. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 225, at 106 (limiting his inquiry to personal injury, “the 
core injury in the law of torts”); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 201, at 923–24, 955, 977. 
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descriptive or normative force related to other types of injury. Even more 
broadly based theoretical work has difficulty contending with certain 
pockets of obligation.228 When theoretical precepts are applied more 
broadly, they often describe more traditional forms of injury or harm.229 
For statutes, it may be difficult to determine whether statutory definitions 
of harm or injury that do not comport with traditional tort conceptions of 
those concepts fit well within the theoretical paradigm. 
Even if the broader field of torts is broken down to its component parts, 
such as negligence or intentional torts, there is little useful theoretical 
ground to mine for purposes of statutory interpretation. Since much of the 
theoretical work focuses on negligence law, the theoretical indeterminacy 
discussed above makes negligence theory problematic in the statutory 
context. However, even intentional tort law and strict liability suffer from 
the same problems.230  
These problems exist even if one ignores practical issues, such as 
determining how tort theory is translated into workable legal doctrines. 
When courts espouse tort principles in specific cases, it is unclear how 
much of the doctrine is being driven by the specific case and how much is 
driven by tort theory.231 Further, judges describing and developing tort law 
may be unaware of or even hostile to tort theory. In many instances, judges 
do not describe the basis for a legal standard.232 
C.  The General Tort Law Fallacy 
Some might argue that while looking to definitions or theory is not 
helpful, relying on tort doctrine provides solutions to statutory 
interpretation problems. At times, courts have claimed to invoke the 
general common law to resolve a problem. A major goal of this Article is 
to eradicate references to the “general common law” in statutory 
construction, because there is no general common law for most tort 
questions. 
                                                                                                                     
 228. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 201, at 951–52 (noting the difficulty wrongs-based 
theories of tort law encounter with strict liability). 
 229. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFORMULATION OF 
TORT LAW 15–49 (Cato Inst. 1980) (describing a theory of torts premised on causation by using 
paradigms such as “A hit B”). 
 230. Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 147, 147 (1988) (“[A] general theory of strict liability is . . . not even a 
possibility. . . .”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional 
Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 135–39 (1981); see also Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., An Economic 
Theory of Intentional Torts: A Comment, 3 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 51–52 (1983); EPSTEIN, 
supra note 229, at 68 (discussing how his strict liability theory prioritizes notions of individual 
liberty over notions of negligence). 
 231. Fletcher, supra note 225, at 130. 
 232. LEVIN, supra note 184, at 30. 
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An example may be helpful. In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Supreme 
Court applied the concept of proximate cause to the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).233 The Court 
stated: “[W]hen Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of 
general tort law.”234 It then purported to apply a general common law 
standard of proximate cause to USERRA.235 However, the Court’s 
reference to a general common law of proximate cause is illusory. There is 
simply no uniform view of proximate cause that applies across all tort 
regimes. Rather, the meaning of proximate cause and the importance of it 
within tort analysis changes depending on the underlying tort at issue. 
Importantly, the Court does not explicitly recognize that proximate cause 
most often plays a role in negligence and strict liability cases and that it is 
rarely used in the intentional tort context.236 It ignores the basic fact that 
many tort doctrines differ depending on the underlying pocket of obligation 
under consideration. 
A nonexhaustive list of other examples is helpful. Foundational 
concepts such as factual and legal cause have different iterations and 
importance, depending on whether the underlying tort is characterized as 
an intentional tort or negligence.237 Contributory negligence is a defense to 
negligence claims, but not typically to intentional torts.238 Punitive 
damages are available for certain kinds of torts and not for others.239 The 
types of torts at issue often affect contribution rules.240  
The way the Supreme Court invokes tort law often ignores the options 
tort law provides. Staub is a good example of the dangers of the tort label. 
The Court exaggerates the work that tort law can perform by failing to fully 
and accurately describe the various options available under tort law. In 
Staub, the Supreme Court imported proximate cause into USERRA 
without reconciling the contested and varying iterations of proximate 
cause.241 Indeed, the Staub Court could have used tort law to reach the 
opposite holding that cat’s paw liability existed without a proximate cause 
                                                                                                                     
 233. 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190–92 (2011). For a comprehensive discussion of Staub, see generally 
Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012) (arguing 
that Staub adds an element to the plaintiff’s burden in employment discrimination cases). 
 234. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1991.  
 235. Id. at 1192–93. 
 236. David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1773 
n.30 (1997); Belton, supra note 1, at 1250. 
 237. Tony Honoré, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 186, at 363, 363 (noting that causation depends on whether fault or strict 
liability is at issue). 
 238. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 201, at 967. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011).  
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limitation. It could have reasoned that discrimination is an intentional tort 
and that intentional torts do not typically rely on notions of proximate 
cause.  
Gross and Nassar also suffer from the same flawed reasoning. Both 
cases held that tort law required a plaintiff to establish “but for” cause.242 
Tort law provides a “but for” cause standard in some instances, but it also 
allows a plaintiff to establish causation using a “substantial factor” 
standard in instances where “but for” cause is problematic.243 Tort law also 
allows the court to shift the burden of disproving causation to the 
defendants in certain instances.244 These two characteristics of causation 
are basic ideas that are taught in first-year torts classes. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court failed to consider whether discrimination cases fit within 
the class of cases for which “but for” cause is inadequate and also failed to 
consider whether discrimination cases present scenarios in which shifting 
burdens to the defendant would be appropriate. The Court thus relied on a 
selected slice of tort law that is narrower than the common law. The 
Supreme Court made important choices about what version of tort law to 
rely on, but these choices are hidden within a purportedly textual analysis 
in which the Court misrepresents the uniformity of the common law. 
V.  THE STAKES OF THE TORT LABEL 
The tort label dramatically distorts the way that courts make decisions 
relating to the discrimination statutes. This Article urges courts to engage 
in a more honest and intellectually compelling interpretation of the 
discrimination statutes, an interpretation that fully comprehends existing 
ambiguities within both discrimination and tort law. In undertaking this 
task, this Article gives proper deference to legal realists and critical race 
and feminist scholars who generally question the interpretive enterprise. As 
noted by others, “between the extremes of ‘formalism’ and radical 
skepticism, there is substantial room in which to operate.”245 This Part 
outlines the stakes if the courts continue on their current interpretive path. 
A.  Limited Reasoning 
The tort label is dangerous because it allows courts to ignore the central 
problems of employment discrimination. The consequences of the tort 
label when combined with a narrow vision of tort law can best be 
illustrated by imagining what the disparate impact doctrine would look like 
if the Supreme Court had applied this narrow tort lens in 1971. The Court 
                                                                                                                     
 242.  See supra notes 91, 109 and accompanying text. 
 243.  See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 244.  See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 245. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 191, at 730.  
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would have reasoned that Title VII is a tort, that torts require either but-for 
or substantial-factor causation, and that no individual could prove that the 
company’s policies (rather than societal discrimination) caused the harm. 
Even those that disagree with the disparate impact theory would agree that 
this reasoning is inadequate to the kind of problem posed in the Griggs 
case.246  
Many important employment discrimination questions remain 
unanswered. Unconscious discrimination theorists posit that discrimination 
is not always caused by conscious animus against a protected group.247  
Structural discrimination theorists propose that the locus of 
discrimination is not always a bad individual or a company policy but 
rather unthinking assumptions about how work is organized.248 Structural 
discrimination often occurs from a mix of intentional, negligent, and 
unconscious motives and actions.  
Courts have not yet fully considered structural discrimination and 
unconscious discrimination cases, but it easy to see how the tort label 
analysis could be used to reject these kinds of claims without any true 
discussion. Courts could analogize discrimination law to a fixed, narrow 
version of tort law with a “purely mechanistic depiction of causation,” a 
failure to fully imagine how groups and entities can cause harm, and an 
inability to fully capture systemic risk.249 If courts view discrimination 
statutes as torts, then they can easily use tort law to deny structural and 
unconscious discrimination claims. This interpretation would not require 
any dialogue about the purposes of employment discrimination law, how 
protected traits limit people within modern workplaces, or whether 
Congress meant to reach these types of claims.  
Courts may be unwilling to recognize claims of structural and 
unconscious discrimination, but simply claiming that tort law requires such 
a result is inadequate.250 This limited reasoning is not demanded by the 
discrimination statutes’ language, structure, or purposes. Nor does 
congressional intent or Court precedent demand such limited analysis. 
                                                                                                                     
 246. For a discussion of Griggs, see supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
 247. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. 
L. REV. 741, 745 (2005); Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive 
in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 419 (2000); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322–27 
(1987). 
 248. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account 
of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 92, 126–27, 138 (2003). 
 249. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 6 
(2011) (noting how tort law lags in its recognition of systemic risk and harm). 
 250. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (arguing that courts may not be willing to go beyond the traditionally 
accepted underpinnings of discrimination law). 
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The tort label also unnecessarily limits the choices available under the 
statutes. It does this by prioritizing tort meanings over other available 
meanings. It then compounds this problem by oversimplifying tort law and 
describing it as more uniform and less contested than it actually is.  
Take again the factual cause issue discussed throughout this Article. 
There are numerous plausible standards that courts could invoke to 
describe causation under the discrimination statutes’ original operative 
language, including “but for” cause, substantial factor, or motivating 
factor. The courts could diminish the importance of the factual cause 
inquiry in cases where plaintiffs prove intent. The courts could shift 
various portions of the causation burden to different parties. Tort label 
analysis reduced all of these options to one without explaining why. The 
Supreme Court’s claim that discrimination is a tort, and that tort law has a 
uniform, narrow view of causation, hides these choices. 
B.  Consistently Poor Analysis 
One key problem with applying the tort label to employment 
discrimination statutes is that the courts and EEOC seem ill equipped to 
apply it well. As discussed throughout this Article, the Supreme Court has 
relied on certain assumptions that are simply untrue, such as the idea that a 
general common law exists.251 They have incorrectly represented the 
common law as monolithic across different types of torts and failed to 
understand the potential breadth within each tort doctrine. They have failed 
to recognize the relational nature of words within tort doctrines. They have 
ignored that employment discrimination statutes modify key aspects of at-
will employment, that they do not use unique tort terms of art, and that they 
are not structured like torts. The courts have also failed to understand that 
only weak arguments support the automatic reach to tort law and that 
stronger textual and purpose-based arguments countenance greatly 
reducing tort law’s role. 
The tort label, when combined with a textual approach to interpretation, 
also ignores a fundamental difference between tort elements and statutory 
regimes. Modern statutes often provide complex, interrelated provisions to 
calibrate when liability should attach and to further the regime’s underlying 
goals.252 Importing the common law without considering the entire 
statutory regime risks upsetting congressional judgments about these 
issues.  
If future analysis just avoided these critical mistakes, it would be 
significantly less flawed than the current approach. It is unclear whether 
the poor analysis is due to a failure to understand tort law or whether it is 
                                                                                                                     
 251. See supra Section IV.C. 
 252. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (Title VII). 
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an intentional attempt to hide policymaking. Whatever the source, it is 
concerning whenever a particular reasoning device routinely leads to 
results that do not make sense when subjected to scrutiny. 
These mistakes are not confined to the Supreme Court. In 2012, the 
EEOC issued regulations interpreting the meaning of the reasonable factor 
other than age (RFOA) provision under the ADEA.253 The EEOC 
considered how the RFOA provision operates in disparate impact cases.254  
As discussed above, disparate impact cases do not share a common 
heritage with tort law. The first step of a disparate impact claim requires 
the plaintiff to establish that a specific employment practice created a 
disproportionate impact because of a protected trait.255 This is a standard 
that has no corollary in common law causation or intent.  
The second step in an ADEA disparate impact case is for the employer 
to establish that the disparate impact was due to a RFOA.256 The courts 
have not fully explained what RFOA means, but the case law to date 
suggests the employer’s required proof would be minimal.257 In an 
admirable effort to give the RFOA standard more meaning, the EEOC 
issued 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e). In issuing the regulation, the EEOC indicated 
that it relied on §§ 292 and 298 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.258 
Any critique of the EEOC’s efforts should begin with a complimentary 
nod toward the political reasoning that undergirds its efforts. The EEOC is 
using the tort label to make its more pro-plaintiff definition of this doctrine 
palatable by tying it to a conservative source of law—the common law. 
While understanding that this move is politically savvy, it is important to 
consider whether the general move to tort law is a good one for the 
employment discrimination statutes generally. This is especially true 
because of the possibility that introducing tort law in one area will lead to 
further convergence of tort and employment discrimination law in other 
ways.259 
There are several problematic aspects of the EEOC’s reasoning. Both 
§§ 292 and 298 of the Restatement govern negligence claims.260 The 
EEOC thus tries to graft a partial negligence analysis as the second step in 
a disparate impact analysis that is not based on tort law generally or 
negligence law specifically. 
                                                                                                                     
 253. EEOC Regulations, supra note 105, at 19095. 
 254. Id.  
 255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005). 
 256. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 96 (2008). 
 257. Judith J. Johnson, Reasonable Factors Other Than Age: The Emerging Specter of Ageist 
Stereotypes, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 49, 80–81 (2009).  
 258. EEOC Regulations, supra note 105, at 19089–90 nn.71, 73. 
 259. Laurin, supra note 183, at 710. 
 260 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 292, 298 (1965). 
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Section 292 of the Restatement governs the factors to be considered in 
determining the utility of an actor’s conduct.261 Yet the EEOC did not 
resolve whether its regulation imported ideas such as the Hand formula and 
economic efficiency into the ADEA. Importantly, ideas about the utility of 
an actor’s conduct are especially value laden and thus courts will have 
great leeway in judging this utility. Applying a subsection based on utility 
concerns is especially problematic in the discrimination context because it 
suggests that the underlying goals of the discrimination statutes might be 
subject to some form of cost-benefit analysis. 
Also interesting is the EEOC’s choice to insert portions of the 
negligence analysis into an RFOA inquiry that otherwise does not look like 
negligence analysis. For example, the new regulation requires courts to 
consider whether “the factor is related to the employer’s stated business 
purpose.”262 There is very little discussion regarding how select portions of 
the negligence standard are supposed to intersect with the ADEA-specific 
portions of the regulation. The EEOC picks and chooses pieces of the 
Restatement’s negligence analysis but does not explain whether the 
remaining sections should be used in RFOA decisions or in interpreting the 
ADEA more broadly. 
In disparate impact cases, the defendant is the one raising RFOA. The 
burdens of production and persuasion mimic those of affirmative defenses. 
Yet the EEOC relies on negligence analysis to interpret RFOA, while also 
claiming that it is not adopting negligence concepts that are often raised 
and proved by defendants such as contributory negligence and assumption 
of risk.263  
While the EEOC does note that it is not adopting the tort law 
wholesale, it does not answer the difficult questions related to its use of 
tort law.264 Was it necessary to use tort law? What work does tort law 
actually perform? Why did it choose tort law? Why did it rely on standards 
for negligence that largely apply in a physical harm context? Can courts 
use other principles in the surrounding sections of the Restatement to 
define RFOA? Why did the agency use the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
rather than the Restatement (Third) of Torts? Is the ADEA generally 
amenable to tort analysis? Like much tort analysis in discrimination cases, 
the reader is left without a clear understanding of whether an independent 
tort principle commands a certain outcome or whether tort law could 
justify almost any regulation the EEOC wanted to craft.  
                                                                                                                     
 261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292 (1965).  
 262. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e)(2)(i) (2013).  
 263. EEOC Regulations, supra note 105, at 19083. The author agrees that neither of these 
concepts should apply to disparate impact; however, by amorphously inserting negligence 
references in the RFOA calculus, courts should expect defendants to start making such arguments. 
 264. Id.  
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When courts use the tort label, they often engage in similarly 
unsatisfying reasoning. For example, in Staub, the Supreme Court 
indicated that the use of causal factor language in a statute incorporates 
“the traditional tort-law concept of proximate cause.”265 This statement 
suggests that there is a fixed and constant theoretical and factual 
application of proximate cause. This statement ignores the fact that 
proximate cause is a notoriously complex concept with contested goals.266 
Staub never explains why USERRA is a tort or how much tort doctrine can 
be used to interpret its provisions. Courts often apply the tort label in this 
cursory way.  
There is strong disagreement regarding the appropriate role of the 
courts in making statutory inquiries, such as whether the courts should 
consider only Congress’s expectations as actually expressed in statutory 
language, whether they should ascertain intent from other sources, or 
whether courts have broader powers to engage in common law decision-
making or decision-making that relies on the broader purposes of the 
underlying statutory regimes.267 At a minimum, though, it is appropriate to 
demand that courts use reasoning devices that meet some basic level of 
legal reasoning. Given the number of analytical missteps in the way courts 
apply tort law to discrimination law, it is debatable whether the use of the 
tort label meets minimal standards for judicial reasoning.  
C.  The Fuzzy Nature of the Tort Label 
The tort label also is highly susceptible to manipulation, especially 
given the way that courts currently use it.268 Strangely, the tort label both 
                                                                                                                     
 265. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011). 
 266. See Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the 
Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 51 (1991); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (9th 
ed. 2009) (providing multiple definitions of proximate cause and indicating that the following terms 
also reflect proximate cause: direct cause, efficient cause, legal cause, procuring cause, and remote 
cause, among others). Further, the definition of proximate cause has changed over time. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. a 
(2010). 
 267. See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 3, 5 (1999) (discussing “ordinary judging” and arguing that judges can 
“help[] the legislature implement good government by fitting statutes into their past and their 
future”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (arguing for a 
more fluid notion of statutory interpretation); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
STATUTES 5–7 (1982) (arguing that so-called judicial activism is actually a function courts perform 
in diminishing the importance of outdated statutes “in the face of the manifest incapacity of 
legislatures to keep those statutes up to date”). 
 268. The courts’ jurisprudence about when to apply the tort label is so unstable that the 
decision whether to even apply the label is confusing and fails to provide any guidance about the 
potential outcome of future cases. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 492 (1994) (Souter, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“While I do not object to referring to the common law when resolving 
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closes avenues of potential argument and at the same time often provides 
the courts with an empty vessel they can later fill with their own non-tort 
meaning. The tort label gives the appearance that courts are tying statutory 
interpretation to traditional sources of law, but the courts often misstate the 
traditional sources of law or radically alter them without explanation. 
As discussed throughout this Article, courts use the tort label to 
foreclose the possibility of statutory ambiguity. For example, the words 
“because of” mean tort causation and tort causation requires the plaintiff to 
establish “but for” cause. This reasoning makes several debatable 
assumptions. The words “because of” are not common law terms of art 
and, given the structure of the discrimination statutes and decades of 
precedent, it is unlikely that the common law is the only source of meaning 
for these words. Further, there are several iterations of common law 
causation. Statutory ambiguity might countenance the use of nontextual 
sources of meaning and would also allow for administrative agencies to 
play a greater role in shaping the law. The tort label hides these statutory 
ambiguities and forecloses textually plausible interpretations of the 
discrimination statutes. 
In many cases, there is no plausible claim that the common law 
demands a particular choice because the common law itself is not uniform. 
The difficulty of using common law words is complicated because the 
same words often have different meanings in different pockets of 
obligation, in response to different factual situations, and even over time. 
Whenever the underlying common law doctrine has contested meanings or 
goals, the courts often provide little analysis about why they chose certain 
meanings or goals over others.  
At times, the courts choose not to resolve underlying ambiguities of the 
common law tort concepts they adopt. In Staub, for example, the Court 
described proximate cause as being concerned with whether there is a 
“direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged,” with whether the cause is “too remote, purely contingent, or 
indirect,” and with whether the cause was of “independent origin that was 
not foreseeable.”269 Thus, the Court cited multiple proximate cause 
rationales that might lead to different results in different factual 
contexts.270 When courts fail to resolve the underlying disarray within a 
common law concept, they risk importing an empty vessel into a statutory 
regime. Thus, a particular term has no fixed definition, but can take 
                                                                                                                     
the question this case presents, I do not think that the existence of [a] tort . . . alone provides the 
answer.”). 
 269. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192 (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of N.Y., 130 S. Ct. 983, 989 
(2010) and Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 270.  Id.  
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whatever meaning or meanings the court chooses to apply in a particular 
instance.271 
Courts also claim to invoke the mantle of traditional common law 
principles, while issuing opinions that do not necessarily follow from the 
common law. Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s use of a tort/agency 
analysis. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court held that 
sexual harassment claims were cognizable under Title VII, but then noted, 
with only a cursory discussion, that the employer would not be held 
automatically liable for all harassment that occurred in the workplace.272 
The Court noted in Meritor that the use of the word “agent” in Title VII 
evinced an intent to place a limit on the actions for which employers would 
be held liable, and then it cited the Restatement.273 The Court indicated that 
agency principles might play a role in such cases, but declined to further 
describe what role they would play.274 This slim reed would be the entry 
point through which the Supreme Court later justified its purported use of 
common law agency principles in Title VII. 
In two subsequent cases, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Court took on the question left 
open in Meritor. In Faragher, the Court transformed Meritor’s 
noncommittal phrasing into strong pronouncements. The Court indicated 
that Meritor expressed the idea that courts look to the common law of 
agency to develop employer liability standards, even though Meritor 
cannot be read this broadly.275 Although the Faragher court noted that the 
Meritor court cautioned that “common-law agency principles may not be 
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII,” the Faragher Court 
transformed Meritor’s citing of the Restatement into an embrace of 
common law agency principles.276  
Importantly, the Court’s invocation of the common law and the way 
that it presented the common law doctrines foreclosed the possibility that 
                                                                                                                     
 271. Another example of this type of reasoning is found in Clackamas Gastroenterology 
Associates v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003). In Clackamas, the Court purported to adopt a common 
law test to determine whether a shareholder–director was an employee under discrimination law, 
even after the Court admitted that the traditional common law did not recognize the type of legal 
entity at issue in the lawsuit and thus did not directly address the question before the Court. Id. at 
447. Further, the Court altered the common law it claimed to adopt, while also failing to address 
why it rejected the economic realities test used in other employment contexts. Id. at 448–50 
(explaining that “[a]t common law the relevant factors defining the master-servant relationship 
focus on the master’s control over the servant” and then announcing six factors relevant in the 
inquiry). 
 272. Meritor, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67, 72 (1986). 
 273. Id. at 72 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219–37 (1958)). 
 274. Id. 
 275. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791–92 (1998).  
 276. Id. (quoting Meritor, 447 U.S. at 72) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
44
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/3
2014] THE TORT LABEL 1095 
 
employers would be automatically liable for all cognizable sexual 
harassment that occurs in the workplace. This move substantially narrowed 
the potential options that the court would consider in thinking about 
agency. 
Common law tort and agency principles entered Title VII with very 
little discussion about why they should be imported. Noticeably, the Court 
did not seriously grapple with whether Title VII, either descriptively or 
normatively, was created against a backdrop of the common law. Neither 
of the opinions engaged in a searching analysis of the text, intent, or 
purpose of Title VII with regard to whether the statutes imported common 
law agency principles. Nor did the Court explore what the use of the 
common law in the statutory regime says about the appropriate link 
between the common law and statutes. 
After using the label of common law agency, the Court then created an 
agency analysis for Title VII that does not mimic the common law of 
agency. The Supreme Court held that employers will be automatically 
liable if they take a tangible employment action against employees.277 In 
cases where a supervisor engages in harassment that does not result in a 
tangible employment action, the employer can prevail if it proves a two-
part affirmative defense.278 The Court created this test by using the general 
idea of agency, the principle of avoidable consequences from tort law, and 
by creating a new goal for Title VII: that it was designed not only to 
remedy discrimination, but to prevent it from happening in the first 
place.279 
The Court thus used the common law label to justify creating an 
analysis that is completely unlike the common law.280 Professor Michael 
Harper noted the Court “cited no common law cases in [its] cursory, 
formal, and rather abstract discussion of the Restatement exception on 
which [it] relied.”281  
Even though the Court issued Faragher and Ellerth on the same day, it 
did not create a uniform rationale for why agency analysis should be 
imported into Title VII. For example, in Ellerth, the Court’s opinion 
focused on the strands of agency analysis that impute liability to the 
                                                                                                                     
 277. Id. at 807. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 804–06. 
 280. Id. at 797, 802 n.3 (stating that “[t]he proper analysis, here, then, calls not for a 
mechanical application of indefinite and malleable factors” from the Restatement, and also 
indicating that the Court was not using pure common law). 
 281. Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional 
Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41, 55 (1999). 
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employer when the employee is aided by the agency relationship.282 In 
Faragher, by contrast, the Court noted that liability might be imputed 
because the supervisor is aided by the employer,283 but also noted that 
liability might be appropriate because the supervisor is acting as a proxy 
for the company284 or because the supervisor is acting within the scope of 
his authority.285 Even stranger, Faragher then appears to not rely on any of 
these rationales and instead conducts “an [i]nquiry into the reasons that 
would support a conclusion that harassing behavior ought to be held within 
the scope of a supervisor’s employment.”286  
Not only did the Supreme Court fail to resolve the proper theoretical 
basis for importing tort and agency principles, it could not even agree on 
the proper source from which to derive those principles. For example, 
Ellerth relied heavily on the Restatement, which it believed enunciated the 
“general common law of agency, rather than on the law of any particular 
State.”287 However, Faragher explicitly rejected “a mechanical application 
of indefinite and malleable factors set forth in the Restatement.”288  
After all of these retreats from the common law standard, it is fair to say 
that the Supreme Court did not import common law agency into Title VII, 
but rather used vague and amorphous ideas centered on a theme of agency 
to create a new analysis for Title VII. This leads to the question of why the 
Supreme Court felt the need to start with the common law at all. 
Reaching to common law helps to hide the level of policymaking in 
which the Court is engaging. It gives the impression that the courts are 
engaging in a traditional analysis. Notice that this Article is not arguing 
that courts should never engage in interpretation that results in 
policymaking. However, it questions whether we can ever fully understand 
the extent of what the courts are doing if they continue to claim reliance on 
what appears to be a traditional analysis. A more honest opinion would 
have declared that Congress failed to define the term “agent” under the 
statute, that there are many competing definitions of employer liability for 
the acts of agents from a wide variety of sources (including the common 
law), that the statutory language provides little basis for differentiating 
between these standards, and then described how the Court navigated 
                                                                                                                     
 282. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (“Although few courts have 
elaborated how agency principles support this rule, we think it reflects a correct application of the 
aided in the agency relationship standard.”). 
 283. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789. 
 284. Id. at 789–90. 
 285. Id. at 791. 
 286. Id. at 797. 
 287. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 
740 (1989)). 
 288. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797. 
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through these options. Instead, the Court ended up with an unsatisfying 
analysis because it tried to cram Title VII into a common law box. 
D.  The Priority Problem 
Another fundamental problem with the tort label is the way it prioritizes 
the common law over other potential sources of statutory meaning and 
dramatically limits administrative deference.  
When courts define employment discrimination as torts, they conceive 
tort law as deriving from the common law, not other statutes. Thus, while 
the Supreme Court labels discrimination statutes as statutory torts, these 
statutory torts do not serve as a source of meaning for interpretive 
questions. Rather, when the Court refers to tort law, it means the common 
law. When courts search for tort law, they refer to various Restatements or 
to state common law, but usually do not include federal statutory law 
within the definition of federal common law.289 Even when courts cite 
prior statutory cases, these cases often relied heavily on common law 
iterations of the underlying doctrines.290 
This is an impoverished view of tort law. If discrimination and other 
statutes are torts, then courts should be able to draw tort meaning from 
them, as well as from other statutes that courts have labeled as torts. 
Through statutes, Congress has radically changed notions of causation. 
Take for example the disparate impact inquiry under the discrimination 
statutes.291 Another example is the causation standard adopted in the 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases, in which the courts have rejected 
application of traditional factual cause.292 Statutes, including portions of 
Title VII that were interpreted prior to the tort label, express different 
notions of causation, intent and harm than those found in the common law. 
One of the few good reasons for applying the tort label to discrimination 
law would be that early thinking about causation, intent, and harm under 
                                                                                                                     
 289. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 1224, 1229 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(considering whether a federal statute provided for certain damages, the court, instead of conducting 
statutory interpretation, looked at the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance). 
 290. For example, in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192 (2011), the Court cited 
several statutory cases that purport to be based on the common law. See Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of 
N.Y., 130 S. Ct. 983, 989 (2010) (“Proximate cause for RICO purposes . . . should be evaluated in 
light of its common-law foundations . . . .”); Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) 
(“Although we agree the statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we think that at the time of 
enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined 
by the law of nations and recognized at common law.”). 
 291. See supra Section V.B. 
 292. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2636 (2011) (“FELA’s language on 
causation . . . ‘is as broad as could be framed.’ Given the breadth of the [causation] phrase . . . we 
have recognized that, in comparison to tort litigation at common law, ‘a relaxed standard of 
causation applies under FELA.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181 
(1949) and Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994))). 
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Title VII could be extended into other areas.  
When the courts look only to the common law to answer statutory 
questions, they ignore other potential sources of meaning. Prioritizing the 
common law is puzzling because there is ample evidence that the 
discrimination statutes rely on concepts from the National Labor Relations 
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and state employment discrimination 
statutes.293  
The Supreme Court tort label analysis also decreases the role of the 
EEOC to interpret statutory ambiguity. According to the Supreme Court, 
certain words in the discrimination statutes clearly require certain tort 
meanings. In making this claim, the Court is refusing to recognize any 
potential ambiguity in the statutory language. Denying ambiguity is 
important because it means that the Court will not be required to examine 
whether the EEOC’s views on a particular issue are entitled to 
deference.294 
CONCLUSION 
The tort label leads to reasoning that is superficial and not transparent 
about its motivations and goals. Courts do not engage in nuanced 
discussions about the kind of reasoning they are using or the values they 
are prioritizing in reaching the result. Importantly, the tort label gives the 
appearance that the courts are engaging in a form of traditional analysis 
that is noncontroversial. 
This Article argues that multiple claims courts make about the 
employment discrimination statutes related to the tort label are so baseless 
that they do not even reach a minimal level of legitimate reasoning. Claims 
that a general common law exists, that core substantive words derive solely 
or even primarily from pure common law, or that the common law is and 
should be the starting point for statutory analysis are not supportable. 
In rejecting the automatic prioritizing of tort law, this Article challenges 
courts to reconcile competing sources of meaning in employment 
discrimination law and discuss why the court is choosing one option over 
others. While this method may appear to be more difficult than current tort 
reasoning, it is only so because the tort label suppresses many important 
discussions. Hopefully, jettisoning the tort label will lead to statutory 
analysis that is more rigorous and honestly performed. 
                                                                                                                     
 293. See supra notes 33, 146 and accompanying text. 
 294. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1994); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
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